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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. 
Issues Presented for Review 
1. Did the District Court Err When it Denied Summary Judgment and 
Submitted to the Jury (And Did not Set Aside Its Verdict On) Dr. Jensen's 
Claim for False Light Invasion of Privacy Grounded on The First Two 
Broadcasts Because Those Claims Were Time-Barred Under the Applicable 
Statute of Limitations for Defamatory Falsehoods Causing Injury? 
Issue Preserved Below: Motion for Summary Judgment (May 22, 2000); Motion for 
Directed Verdict (Nov. 29, 2000); Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
("JNOV") (March 27, 2001). [R. 2741; 2998-3002; 5968; 6038-6040; 6844 at 12.] 
Standard of review: "The trial court's application of a statute of limitations presents a 
question of law which [is reviewed] for correctness." Estes v. Tibbs, 979 P.2d 823, 824 
(Utah 1999); see also Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262 (Utah 2000) (reversing denial of 
summary judgment motion on statute of limitations grounds). 
2. Did the District Court Err When it Denied Summary Judgment and 
Submitted to the Jury (And Did Not Set Aside Its Verdict On) Dr. Jensen's 
Three Alternative Claims Asserting An Invasion of His Sphere of Personal 
Privacy, Solitude or Seclusion, Premised Exclusively Upon the Defendant's 
Recording of Conversations In Which Ms. Sawyers Was A Participant, in the 
Course of Receiving Professional Medical Services Rendered by Dr. Jensen? 
Issue Preserved Below: Motion for Summary Judgment (May 22, 2000), Motion for 
Directed Verdict (Nov. 16, 2000); Motion for JNOV (Mar. 27, 2001). [R. 2741; 2951-
2964; 5701, 5720-5724; 5968, 6042-6050.] Standard of Review: The question whether 
one's expectation of privacy is an objectively reasonable one, as is required for an 
1 
intrusion claim, is one of law, reviewed for correctness. In reA.CC, 44 P.3d 708, 710 
(Utah 2002); United States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1997); see also 
Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988). A decision to grant or deny a motion for 
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. State ex rel Office of Recovery Servs. v. 
McCoy, 999 P.2d 572, 574 (Utah 2000). Similarly, when a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is premised upon a matter of law, the decision is reviewed for 
correctness. Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). 
3. Did the District Court Commit Plain Error When it Submitted to the Jury 
Dr. Jensen's Claims for False Light Invasion of Privacy Where the 
Defendants' Broadcasts Focused Exclusively on Dr. Jensens' Discharge of His 
Professional Duties as State Licensed and Regulated Medical Care 
Practitioner? 
Issue Not Preserved Below: Because this purely legal question was not presented to the 
court below, but see infra n. 22, this Court addresses this issue under the "plain error" 
standard of review. See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51, n.l (Utah 1996). 
4* Did the District Court Err When it Denied Summary Judgment and 
Submitted to the Jury (And Did Not Set Aside Its Jury's Verdict On) Dr. 
Jensen's Claims for Defamation and False Light Because the Defendants' 
Broadcasts Were Substantially True? 
Issue Preserved Below: Motion for Summary Judgment (May 22, 2000); Motion for 
Directed Verdict (Nov. 16, 2000); Motion for JNOV (Mar. 27, 2001). [R. 2741, 2964-
2965, 2975-2997; 5701, 5706-5719; 5968, 6028-6038]. Standard of review: Whether 
liability was imposed on the basis of published statements that were substantially true, 
and thereby constituted "a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression," is a 
question of law, reviewed de novo. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 
2 
516 (1991), Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984); 
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) (whether statements are 
substantially true as a matter of law is properly decided by the court); Ogden Bus Lines v. 
KSLf Inc., 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1976) (same); accord Liberty Lobbyf Inc. v. Dow 
Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("substantial truth" subject to 
independent appellate review); Locricchio v. Evening News Ass yn, 476 N.W.2d 112, 124 
(Mich. 1991) (same). The standards for review of rulings on motions for summary 
judgment and post-trial motions are the same as set forth above under issue 2. 
5. Did the District Court Err When it Did Not Set Aside the Jury's Verdict 
On Dr. Jensen's Claims for Economic Damages Allegedly Flowing From the 
Defendants' Third Broadcast, Where There Was No Evidence That Dr. 
Jensen Suffered Any Economic Damages as a Result of That Broadcast? 
Issue Preserved Below: Motion for JNOV (Mar. 27, 2001), Motion for a New Trial and 
to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Mar. 27, 2001). [R. 5960, 5987-5989; 5968, 6040-
6042.] Standard of review: This Court reviews whether there is "substantial evidentiary 
support" for the jury's verdict awarding economic damages as a proximate result of the 
defendants' wrongful conduct by viewing the evidence marshalled in support of the 
verdict in the light most favorable to the appellee. Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. 
Keil, 48 P.3d 888, 892 (Utah 2002); Fitz v. Synthes USA, 990 P.2d 391, 392-93 (Utah 
1999). The standard of review for post-trial motions is the same as stated above under 
issue 2. 
3 
6. Must the Jury's Award of Punitive Damages on the Defamation and False 
Light Claims Be Vacated Because There is No Clear and Convincing 
Evidence That the Defendants Published the Statements At Issue with Actual 
Malice? 
Issue Preserved Below: Motion for Directed Verdict (Nov. 16, 2000); Motion for JNOV 
(Mar. 27, 2001). [R. 5701-5703; 5968, 6024-6025; 6849 at 37-38; 6844 at 18.] Standard 
of review: "The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is 
sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law." Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 
900 (Utah 1992). Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 
P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). 
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes, etc. 
(whose interpretation is determinative) 
U.S. Const. Amend. 1 [Addendum 1] 
Utah Const., Art. 1 Sec. 15 [Addendum 2] 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 45-2-3; 76-9-401(1) & (2); 76-9-402(1 )(a) & (b); 78-12-29(4); 58-37-
4(2)(b)(iii)(A) [Addendum 3] 
Utah Admin. Code R156-37-11(11) & (14) (1994) [Addendum 4] 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and 
for Utah County (Case No. 970400512CV), Judge Ray Harding, Jr. presiding. The 
plaintiff/appellee Michael Jensen, M.D. ("Dr. Jensen") asserted various tort and statutory 
claims (as identified below) against defendants/appellants Mary Sawyers and KTVX-TV 
4 
("defendants") based upon the preparation and broadcast of three separate news reports 
concerning (1) Dr. Jensen's prescribing practices that were, by his own admission, in 
violation of governing law and regulations, and (2) the disciplinary proceedings instituted 
against Dr. Jensen by the Utah Division of Professional and Occupational Licensing 
("DOPL") as a result of those violations. 
B. The Course Of Proceedings And Disposition In The Court Below 
Dr. Jensen filed this action on June 27, 1997, alleging claims for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, defamation, intentional interference with prospective economic 
relations, and negligence. [R. 9.] In December 1998, defendants moved for summary 
judgment on the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims in their entirety, and on the 
other three claims only insofar as they were based on the September 5, 1995 and June 17, 
1996 broadcasts, on the grounds that those broadcasts were barred by the one-year statute 
of limitations provided in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4). [R. 250, 363.] 
In January 1999, Dr. Jensen moved to amend his Complaint to add four additional 
claims: (1) invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion; (2) violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-9-401 et seq.; (3) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511; and (4) invasion of privacy/false 
light. [R. 383.] Following a hearing on April 4, 1999, the trial court granted Dr. Jensen's 
Motion to Amend Complaint, and granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, and on the defamation claim, insofar as 
that claim was based on the September 5, 1995 and June 17, 1996 broadcasts, but denied 
summary judgment on the other claims based on those broadcasts. [R. 1016, 1142.] 
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On May 22, 2000, defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Dr. 
Jensen's remaining claims on grounds of statute of limitations, substantial truth, lack of 
actual malice, fair report and public interest privileges, insufficient specificity in pleading 
the claims, lack of proof of elements of claims for intrusion, statutory violations and 
tortious interference. [R. 2741, 3029.] Following a hearing on August 24, 2000, Judge 
Harding denied that motion in its entirety. [R. 4137.] 
A trial before a jury of eight was held from October 30 through December 4, 2000. 
Defendants made written and oral motions for a directed verdict during the trial on all 
claims, [R. 5701, 5725; 6849 at 4-39; 6844 at 12], which motions were granted as to the 
negligence claim but denied as to all other claims. [R. 6844 at 12, 25.] 
The jury found no liability on Dr. Jensen's claims for violation of the federal 
wiretap statute and tortious interference based on the first broadcast [R. 5762-5763] 
[Addendum 5], and found that Dr. Jensen had suffered no damages as a result of the 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-402(1 )(c) & 403. [R. 5764-5767.] The jury found 
in favor of Dr. Jensen and awarded him $520,000 in economic damages, $85,000 in 
general damages, and $245,300 in punitive damages on the false light claim premised 
upon the first two broadcasts (Sept. 6, 1995 and June 17, 1996); $1,000,000 in economic 
damages, $500,000 in general damages, and $450,600 in punitive damages on the false 
light or defamation claim premised upon the third (Nov. 6, 1996) broadcast [R. 5774-
5777] and $90,000 each on the two statutory and one common law intrusion claims. [R. 
5768-5773.] The jury also awarded Dr. Jensen $25,000 in general damages and $25,000 
in punitive damages (with no pecuniary damages) on his tortuous interference claim. [R. 
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5760-5761.] The trial court entered a nonfmal judgment for those amounts on March 13, 
2001. [R. 5888.] 
On March 27, 2001, defendants filed a Motion for JNOV and a Motion for New 
Trial and to Alter or Amend the Judgment. [R. 5968, 6052; 5960, 6019.] By Order date4 
October 25, 2001, the trial court denied in part the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, denied the Motion for a New Trial, and denied in part the Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment. [R. 6782.] [Addendum 6] The trial court granted defendants' 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Dr. Jensen's claims for violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-9-402(c) and 76-9-403. [R. 6781-6782.] The trial court also ruled that the 
jury's award of the damages under the three claims for intrusion and violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-9-403(a) and (b) were duplicative, and therefore reduced the three 
separate awards (of $50,000 in compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive damages 
on each claim) by $180,000 to leave a single award of $90,000. Id 
On November 21, 2001, Defendants filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the trial 
court's final judgment of October 25, 2001. [R. 6787.] Dr. Jensen filed his Notice of 
Cross-Appeal on December 3, 2001. [R. 6806.] 
C. Statement Of The Facts Relevant To The Issues Presented For Review 
At the time of the relevant events, Dr. Jensen was a physician practicing medicine 
pursuant to a license issued by Utah's Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing ("DOPL"). [PL's Ex. 39 fflf 1-2.1] All of Dr. Jensen's actions that were 
reported upon by the defendants (and that served as the basis for all claims) were 
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performed in his professional capacity, as a licensed physician, and subject to regulation, 
oversight, and administrative sanctions by the DOPL. Utah Code Ann. §58-l-401(2)(a) 
(1999). 
1. At a Social Gathering, Dr. Jensen Violates The Regulations That Govern the 
Prescribing of Controlled Substances 
On or about July 4, 1995, Dr. Jensen attended a party at the home of his 
acquaintance Lisa Johnson. [R. 6845 (Johnson) at 56; R. 6849 (Roth) at 102; R. 6865 
(Jensen) at 79.] At the party, Dr. Jensen wrote a prescription for Ms. Johnson for Fastin, 
a Schedule IV controlled substance (amphetamine) that is used as a diet pill. [PL's Ex. 
23.] Ms. Johnson had never been a patient of Dr. Jensen's. [R. 6845 (Johnson) at 61; R. 
6866 (Jensen) at 137.] It was undisputed that Johnson told Dr. Jensen she was not 
interested in using the diet pills, [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 121 lines 24-25 & 140 lines 5-11; R. 
6856 at 14 & R. 6865 at 107 lines 12-18; R. 6845 (Johnson) at 59], but Dr. Jensen 
nonetheless wrote out the prescription and gave it to Johnson. [R. 6865 (Jensen) at 85; R. 
6849 (Roth) at 109-10; R. 6845 (Johnson) at 59]. Prior to prescribing Fastin, Dr. Jensen 
did not conduct any physical examination of Ms. Johnson [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 128-131], 
nor did he "determine[]... through review of the records of prior treatment... that 
[Johnson] ha[d] made a substantial, good faith effort to lose weight in a treatment 
program . . . without the utilization of controlled substances." See Utah Admin. Code 
R156-37-1 l(14)(a) (1995); [PL's Ex. 16; R. 6845 (Johnson) at 61; R. 6866 (Jensen) at 
139 line 13 - 140 line 4]. Johnson was not "obese" at that time. [R. 6849 (Roth) at 105.] 
1
 All of the admitted trial exhibits are contained in a single box. [R. 6863.] 
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Dr. Jensen did not determine whether there were contraindications to her use of Fastin. 
[R. 6845 (Johnson) at 61.] In fact, Ms. Johnson has a heart condition that could have 
been seriously aggravated if she took the amphetamine Dr. Jensen had prescribed. 
[R. 6845 (Johnson) at 89; R. 6849 (Roth) at 116-17.] It is undisputed that Dr. Jensen's 
prescribing of Fastin to Ms. Johnson was in violation of Utah Admin. Code Rl 56-37-
11(14). 
2. KTVX Decides to Investigate; Sawyers' Phone Call to Dr. Jensen Confirms 
Her Suspicion That Dr. Jensen Freely Dispenses Controlled Substances in Violation of 
State Regulations 
Geoff Roth, then the managing editor at KTVX, witnessed Dr. Jensen's actions at 
the party. [R. 6849 (Roth) at 102-112.] Roth discussed these events with John Edwards, 
then the news director at KTVX, [ Id. at 113-115; R. 6864 (Edwards) at 26 lines 10-24], 
and prepared a "story idea." [PL's Ex. 25.] Edwards and Roth agreed to assign 
defendant Mary Sawyers, a KTVX reporter who often reported on health and medical 
issues, to investigate the matter for a possible news story. [R. 6859 (Roth) at 115; R. 
6864 (Edwards) at 26-28, 32 line 5-34 line 6.] Sawyers first spoke with Lisa Johnson 
and confirmed Roth's recollection of the events at her party. [R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 90.] 
Some time later in July 1995, Sawyers phoned Dr. Jensen to discuss diet pills. 
Sawyers asked Dr. Jensen: "What is it that you prescribe [for weight loss]?" Dr. Jensen 
responded: "Right now what is used most is just Fastin and something called Pondimin. 
Dr. Jensen testified that he understood from his secretary, Laurie Scott, that Sawyers 
had called the FirstMed Clinic and stated that she was desperate to lose five pounds in 
two weeks or she'd lose her job as an on-air reporter, [R. 6865 (Jensen) at 119; R. 6856 at 
24, lines 17-20; R. 6868 (Scott) at 71-75, 79-80], a claim that Sawyers denied. 
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Traditionally what has been used is Dexedrine. Dexedrine technically is illegal to use as 
a diet pill... [unintelligible]... sometimes I find people have other disorders that I feel 
comfortable using Dexedrine with." [Defs. Ex. 93 at 4 (emphasis added); see also Pl.fs 
Ex. 27. ] During the phone call, Dr. Jensen also stated that many doctors "are reluctant to 
prescribe prescription diet pills/9 but "I really am not." [Defs. Ex. 93 at 3.] Sawyers told 
Dr. Jensen she had been on a diet recently and had not lost much weight, [Id. at 2], but 
also that she wished to lose only ten pounds. [Id. at 4.] Dr. Jensen told Sawyers that he 
had prescribed "Dexedrine" to one of his patients (who had put on 20 extra pounds while 
on her mission) and she had lost that weight in a month-and-a-half. [Id. at 5.] Sawyers 
asked Jensen whether he could prescribe diet pills for her without her having to come to 
his office (as he had for Ms. Johnson); Jensen told Sawyers that he could not call in the 
prescription, and that she should come in for an office visit. Sawyers agreed. [Id. at 7.] 
3. After Station Personnel Decide the Matter is Worthy of Further Investigation, 
Sawyers Visits Dr. Jensen to Obtain Diet Pills 
After Sawyers had conducted additional research into the law that governs a 
licensed doctor's prescribing of controlled substances for weight loss [R. 6864 (Sawyers) 
at 180-181; R. 6871 at 88-89, 138; R. 6843 at 111; see also PL's Ex. 233], and after she 
discussed her findings with Edwards [R. 6871 (Sawyers) at 138], defendants determined 
that they would further investigate whether Dr. Jensen made a practice of prescribing 
controlled substances for weight loss without complying with governing regulations. 
3
 Because "Dexedrine" (Dextroamphetamine) is a Schedule II controlled substance, see 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2002), it is illegal to 
10 
[R. 6864 (Edwards) at 29-30.] Sawyers and Edwards agreed that they would not carry a 
story about Dr. Jensen if they discovered that he complied with governing regulations 
when Sawyers visited him as a patient. [R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 18 lines 1-7; Id. at 95 line 
7 - 9 6 line 1; R. 6864 (Edwards) at 32 lines 5-10.] 
On July 27, 1995, Sawyers went to the FirstMed clinic where Dr. Jensen practiced 
part-time. [R. 6867 (Jensen) at 155-156.] The FirstMed clinic was open to the public 
and treated walk-in patients. [R. 6867 (Katour) at 7 lines 4-6, Id. at 8-9; R. 6868 (Scott) 
at 58 line 17-59 line 20.] During the office visit, Dr. Jensen wrote a three-month 
prescription for Fastin and Pondimin (the diet pill combination "Phen-Fen") and gave it 
to Sawyers. [Defs.' Ex. 77A; R. 6847 (Jensen) at 100 lines 14-15.] It was undisputed 
that Dr. Jensen prescribed these drugs to Sawyers without first conducting a physical 
examination. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 194 lines 10-22.] Although Dr. Jensen's medical 
assistant had taken Sawyers' blood pressure [R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 109; R. 6867 (Katour) 
at 12-13], Dr. Jensen did not ask Sawyers any questions about her blood pressure history 
prior to giving her the Phen-Fen prescription; nor did he ask whether she had ever had 
diabetes (or any other illness, disease, or pre-existing medical conditions)4 that might 
constitute contraindications for Phen-Fen. [PL's Ex. 33; Defs. Ex. 99.] Nor did Dr. 
Jensen listen to Sawyers' heart or lungs. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 185 lines 11-16, 194 lines 
prescribe Dexedrine for weight loss. Utah Admin. Code R156-37-11(11)(1995); [PL's 
Ex. 16]. 
4
 Sawyers did fill in a medical conditions checklist prior to entering the patient 
examination room [R. 6871] (Sawyers), at 55 lines 13-18; R. 6866 at 17 lines 3-6], but 
did not know whether Dr. Jensen had reviewed it [R. 6847 (Sawyers), R. 6866 at 203 line 
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1-8.] Prior to giving Sawyers the prescription, Dr. Jensen did not ask whether she was 
on any medications at the time,5 including medications to control high blood pressure. 
[R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 168-69.] Neither he nor his assistant ever took her weight or asked 
her what she weighed. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 188 lines 5-9; R. 6867 (Katour) at 14-15.] 
Sawyers, who is 5''4" tall, weighed approximately 123 pounds at the time and was not 
overweight. [R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 181; see also R. 6857 (Van Komen) at 170-71.] 
At trial, for the first time,6 Dr. Jensen claimed that he "intended" to conduct a 
physical examination of Sawyers after he had given her the Phen-Fen prescription, but, 
he claimed, Sawyers left his office abruptly before he could conduct the examination. 
[See, e.g., R. 6865 (Jensen) at 130-131; & R. 6866 (Jensen) at 40-41.] The videotape of 
the interview indicated no expression of intent to require further examination either 
before Dr. Jensen handed Sawyers the prescription or immediately thereafter. [Defs. Ex. 
99; R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 140-41.] 
In addition, during the office visit, the following exchange occurred: 
Jensen: If Fastin d[oesn't] work for you [for weight loss], I would 
be willing to work with you maybe using Dexedrine. It is technically not 
legal for that reason. 
Sawyers: For weight loss? 
23 - 204 line 7], and Dr. Jensen was unable to produce a copy of it. [R. 6866 (Jensen), at 
190 lines 11-28.] 
5
 Although Dr. Jensen later claimed that he began his discussion with Sawyers by asking 
her whether she was presently on any medications, [PLfs Ex. 37 at 7], the recording of 
their conversation does not so indicate. [Defs. Ex. 99.] At trial, Jensen testified that he 
asked Sawyers whether she was taking any medications after he had already given her the 
prescription, (and after the videotape ended). [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 183, 188.] 
Dr. Jensen had never previously made any such claim - not to the DOPL, nor in his 
sworn deposition. [R. 6867 (Jensen) at 146, 151, 73-76; see also Defs. Ex. 86.] 
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Jensen: Right. Dexedrine is used for Attention Deficit Disorder. . . . 
The other one is Narcolepsy. People fall asleep at the wheel. So those are 
the legal reasons to use those medicines. 
Sawyers: So, what, do you just put down Attention Deficit Disorder? 
Jensen: I usually, usually put Narcolepsy in an adult. We all deal with 
fatigue and tiredness, and you can just say lam tired... . 
[Defs. Ex. 99 at 2-3 (emphasis added).7] 
In addition, during the office visit, Dr. Jensen made the following statements 
(describing the Fastin capsules): 
Jensen: You can actually take a small amount of the capsule and 
bite it and at that moment you get that effect. // is technically a way of 
abusing these, okay} Uhm. And it could be dangerous if you bit an 
entire capsule. Okay. But it is one way of breaking that time release 
form of it. Grinding it on your teeth. 
Sawyers: So, if I start to crash, just take a pill and bite on it? 
Jensen: You would actually take the capsule, open it up, and then 
put just a[...]. You can sometimes go like that, [(demonstrating)] 
Sawyers: Oh. The granules, pebbles, okay. 
Jensen: You can just bite them. Ideally you wouldn't get into a 
situation where you need to do that. You could take caffeine on top of 
this if you needed to. Okay 
n 
Later, during the same office visit, Dr. Jensen reiterated that if the Phen-Fen 
prescription did not prove effective, he'd "work with [her] a little bit, and [uh] with other 
things." [Defs. Ex. 99 at 4.] 
8
 Remarkably, at trial, Dr. Jensen denied that he had told Sawyers that grinding Fastin 
granules between the teeth was a way "of abusing" the drug. [R. 6867 (Jensen) at 43-46. 
But see Defs.' Ex. 99 at 7.] 
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Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
Dr. Jensen knew Sawyers was a journalist employed by Channel 4. [R. 6865 
(Jensen) at 104, lines 19-25.] Nevertheless, at no time during the office visit did Dr. 
Jensen tell Sawyers that he wanted his conversation with her to be "confidential" or that 
Sawyers should not disclose it to any third party. [Defs. Ex. 99.] Unbeknownst to Dr. 
Jensen, his professional interaction with Sawyers was recorded by Sawyers, by means of 
a hidden video camera she had brought with her into the examination room. [Pl.?s Ex. 34; 
R. 6871 (Sawyers) at 21; R. 6864 (Edwards) at 39 line 15-40 line 3.] Sawyers and 
Edwards had determined, prior to Sawyers5 visit, that there was no other reasonable 
means to gather proof of Dr. Jensen's prescribing practices because if Dr. Jensen was 
aware that she was recording their interaction, he would likely alter his conduct in the 
camera's presence. [R. 6871 (Sawyers) at 29-35; R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 94; R. 6864 
(Edwards) at 44 lines 3-13.] 
4. Dr. Jensen Writes Another Phen-Fen Prescription Without Complying with 
Applicable State Regulations 
Later the same day that Dr. Jensen had prescribed Phen-Fen to Sawyers, a nurse 
practitioner at the FirstMed Clinic, Sandra Peterson Katour, approached him and asked if 
he'd be willing to write her a prescription for Phen-Fen as well. [R. 6867 (Katour) at 18-
19; R. 6856 (Jensen) at 18.] Dr. Jensen admitted that although he did not perform a 
physical examination or obtain a medical history from her, he wrote out a Phen-Fen 
prescription for Katour. [R. 6856 (Jensen) at 18; R. 6867 (Katour) at 18-19; 23-24.] 
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5. KTVX Continues Its Investigation Into Dr. Jensen's Prescribing Practices 
On or about August 22, 1995, Mary Sawyers met with David Robinson, then the 
Director of the DOPL. [R. 6871 (Sawyers) at 83-86; R. 6850 (Robinson) at 193.] After 
viewing the videotape of Sawyers' July 27, 1995 office visit with Dr. Jensen, Robinson 
concluded as follows: 
I think that when you look at the intent of that physician, it's clear that 
he knows that he is violating the law and is offering excuses for it. And 
I think he's doing so with potential jeopardy to his patients. I don't 
think that's in the best interest of his patients. I am very concerned 
about it. 
[R. 6850 (Robinson) at 201; PL's Exs. 19 & Defs. Ex. 115] [See Addendum 7]. 
Robinson asked Sawyers and KTVX-TV not to broadcast the portion of the tape 
where Dr. Jensen had instructed her how to bite down on the time-release granules so as 
not to instruct the general public how to abuse a drug (which request the defendants 
honored). [R. 6864 (Sawyers) at 148-49; Defs. Ex. 107 & 108.] Robinson asked 
Sawyers for a copy of the full tape and referred the matter to the DOPL's Bureau of 
Investigators and to the federal Drug Enforcement Administration. [R. 6850 (Robinson) 
at 196.] 
On or about August 29, 1995, Sawyers conducted a follow-up interview with Dr. 
Jensen, videotaped with his consent, during which Sawyers and Dr. Jensen discussed diet 
pills and weight loss. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 8-9; Pl.fs Ex. 37.] Sawyers questioned Dr. 
Jensen about his professional conduct during her earlier visit to his medical clinic. [R. 
6866 (Jensen) at 10-11.] Dr. Jensen confirmed that his two previous statements to 
Sawyers regarding Dexedrine were correct: Dexedrine could not legally be prescribed for 
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weight loss. [PL's Ex. 37 at 6.] Confronted with his earlier statement that if Phen-Fen 
didn't work for Sawyers he was willing to "work with" her in prescribing Dexedrine (and 
write up a false diagnosis of narcolepsy to justify the prescription), Dr. Jensen claimed 
that in light of his additional research (confirming the illegality of such conduct)9 
prescribing Dexedrine "is something that, uh, is not a possibility now." [PL's Ex. 37 at 
6-] 
6. The First Broadcast 
On September 5, 1995, during its evening newscasts, KTVX aired a story 
regarding diet pills, including the combination Phen-Fen. [PL's Exs. 19 & Defs. Ex. 115] 
The broadcast included portions of Sawyers' taped patient visit with Dr. Jensen inside the 
examination room. See id 
On September 5, 1995, (the date of the first of defendants' three broadcasts), Dr. 
Jensen was working: (1) as an independent contractor at the Columbia FirstMed Clinic 
for approximately 10-15 hours per week, at $45 per hour, without benefits [R. 6868 
(Johnson) at 14 lines 15 -25; 16 lines 10-12]; (2) as an independent contractor at the Art 
City Family Medical Center for approximately 20-40+ hours per week, at $70 per hour, 
without benefits, [R. 6867 (Jensen) at 155-56], and (3) as a part-time independent 
contractor at Columbia's WorkMed Clinic. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 34-35 & 65.] On 
September 6, 1995, the Columbia FirstMed Clinic terminated Dr. Jensen's part-time 
9
 As part of his "research," after he confirmed with a pharmacist that Dexedrine could not 
legally be prescribed for weight loss, Dr. Jensen asked whether there was any "way 
around" this law, including his writing up a diagnosis of narcolepsy. [R. 6856 (Jensen) at 
34-39; Defs.f Ex. 245.] 
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employment at the clinic, [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 33 line 20-34 line 13; R. 6856 (Jensen) at 
27 line 17], and Dr. Jensen also lost hospital privileges at Mountain View Hospital. [R. 
6856 (Jensen) at 27 lines 21-24.] 
7. IHC Removes Dr. Jensen From Its Insurance Panels 
On or about September 22, 1995, IHC Health Plans removed Dr. Jensen from its 
insurance panels, citing his "unprofessional" and "possibly illegal" conduct that was 
portrayed on the KTVX broadcast. [PL's Ex. 199; R. 6866 (Jensen) at 63 lines 18-25.] 
As a result, he became ineligible to bill IHC Health Plans for providing medical services 
to patients insured by IHC. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 64 lines 1-18.] When Dr. Jensen later 
sought reinstatement to IHC Health Plans [PL's Ex. 200], he was denied reinstatement 
because he was not board eligible or board certified, which was then a prerequisite for 
approval as an IHC-insured provider. [PL's Ex. 199 at 3; R. 6866 (Jensen) at 66; Id. at 
112-115.] 
8. DOPL Institutes Formal Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dr. Jensen 
On June 17, 1996, the DOPL filed a Petition against Dr. Jensen alleging two 
counts of "unprofessional conduct," based on the medical care he provided to Sawyers 
during her office visit. [PL's Ex. 38] [Addendum 8]. That Petition alleged that: 
3. a. On or about July 27, 1995, Dr. Jensen . . . gave Sawyers 
prescriptions for Fastin (Phentermine Hydrochloride) and Pondimin 
(Fenfluramine Hydrochloride), each a Schedule IV controlled substance. 
Prior to providing these prescriptions, Dr. Jensen failed to perform a 
thorough physical examination or determine from Sawyers that she had 
made a substantial good-faith effort to lose weight in a treatment 
program . . . without the utilization of controlled substances, and failed 
to inquire [about]. . . possible contraindications to the controlled 
substances he had prescribed. 
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b. During the visit, Dr. Jensen described to Sawyers how she 
could accelerate and enhance the stimulant qualities of Fastin by 
opening the capsule and "biting" the granules contained therein. 
c. Dr. Jensen also told Sawyers that if Fastin did not produce 
the desired weight-loss results she sought, he would be willing to "work 
with" her "maybe using Dexedrine" (Dextroamphetamine), a Schedule 
II controlled substance, though he acknowledged to Sawyers the use of 
Dexedrine for weight control is "technically not legal." Respondent told 
Sawyers he would use narcolepsy as the claimed reason for prescribing 
Dexedrine, since its use for that purpose is permitted. Id. 
The DOPL Petition alleged that Dr. Jensen violated Utah Admin. Code Rl 56-37-
1 l(14)(a) and (b), and engaged in "unprofessional conduct" as defined by Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-l-501(2)(a), (b), and (g). [PL's Ex. 38.] The DOPL Petition further alleged 
that Dr. Jensen's "unprofessional conduct" constituted grounds for imposing sanctions on 
his licenses to practice medicine and to administer and prescribe controlled substances, 
under its authority to "revoke, suspend, restrict, place on probation, issue a public or 
private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon" the license of a respondent practitioner. Id. 
at 10-11; Utah Code Ann. §58-l-401(2)(a). 
9. The Second Broadcast 
On June 17, 1996, (the day the DOPL Petition was filed), KTVX broadcast a news 
story reporting that DOPL had filed its Petition against Dr. Jensen. [See PL's Ex. 20 
(tape) & Defs. Exs. 128A (transcript)] [Addendum 9]. Dr. Jensen testified that he was 
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"fired" from the IHC WorkMed Clinic shortly after the June 17, 1996 broadcast, 
allegedly as a result of that broadcast. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 67 lines 4-21.]10 
10. Dr. Jensen Settles with DOPL, Admits He Violated Regulation 
On or about October 30, 1996, Dr. Jensen voluntarily entered into a Stipulation 
and Order with DOPL to resolve the claims of unprofessional conduct contained in the 
DOPL Petition. [PL's Ex. 39 ("DOPL Stipulation")] [Addendum 10]. By signing the 
DOPL Stipulation, Dr. Jensen admitted "that he failed to comply with some of the 
requirements of [Utah Controlled Substance Rules] 156-37-1 l(14)(a) and (b) as set forth 
in paragraph 3 of the [DOPL] petition." Id. [See also R. 6867 (Jensen) at 94 (admitting 
that the Stipulation was correct).] Dr. Jensen stipulated to a public reprimand, and agreed 
to meet quarterly with DOPL's Physicians' Licensing Board for a period of one year and 
to complete courses on medical ethics and proper prescribing practices. Id. 
11. The Third Broadcast 
On November 6, 1996, KTVX broadcast a news story that reported on several 
doctors who had been charged with unprofessional conduct and/or disciplined by DOPL. 
[See PL's Ex. 21; Defs. Ex. 132A] [Addendum 11]. The November 6, 1996 broadcast 
was primarily based upon a book, entitled Questionable Doctors^ prepared and published 
by a Washington, D.C. watchdog group. Id. The news report profiled several doctors 
who were listed in the book, including Dr. E. Barry Topham, whose Utah license was 
10
 Despite this testimony, Dr. Jensen continued to earn income from working on a 
contract basis for IHC during 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, at least part of which was 
derived from the IHC WorkMed Clinic. [R. 6850 (Stuart) at 130 lines 7-16; 132 lines 1-8; 
133 lines 20-23; 135 lines 12-21.] 
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suspended in 1991 after he was found to have had sexual relations with a patient; Dr. 
Wesley Harline, a Utah physician who continued to practice medicine four years after 
DOPL had charged him with performing illegal abortions and disfiguring patients; and 
Dr. Sherman Johnson, who "was sent to jail for giving a patient a lethal dose of 
Demarol." [Id. at 1-2; see also R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 127 (noting that the patient who 
died was an addict).] 
The news report raised questions about the efficacy of the state regulatory 
oversight of the medical profession. It also included the following brief segment: 
AND WHAT ABOUT DR. MICHAEL JENSEN? 
IN JULY 1995, WE CAUGHT HIM ON CAMERA 
PROMISING ME ILLEGAL DRUGS FOR WEIGHT LOSS. 
(Statement by Dr. Michael Jensen]: "If Fastin didn't work 
for you, I'd be willing to work with you, maybe using 
Dexedrine. It's technically not legal for that reason." 
THE STATE FILED AN ACTION AGAINST JENSEN 
LAST JUNE. 
BUT AGAIN, THE CASE IS IN THE HANDS OF 
LAWYERS... 
AND DR. JENSEN IS STILL PRACTICING. 
[Defs. Ex. 132A at 2.] The taped piece then described how other Utah-based doctors 
whose medical licenses had been revoked by DOPL were subsequently reinstated. Then, 
as soon as the taped segment ended, Sawyers appeared live in the studio and stated: 
ONE POSTSCRIPT TO OUR STORY: YESTERDAY 
WE GOT WORD THAT ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN 
AGAINST DR. MICHAEL JENSEN. 
HE'S THE ONE WE CAUGHT ON TAPE PROMISING 
ME ILLEGAL DRUGS. 
THE STATE WILL ALLOW JENSEN TO KEEP HIS 
LICENSE, BUT HE WILL RECEIVE A PUBLIC 
REPRIMAND WHICH REQUIRES HIM TO ATTEND A 
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WORKSHOP ON PROPER PRESCRIBING. . .AND A 
COURSE ON MEDICAL ETHICS. Id 
12. Dr. Jensen's Damages Presentation 
Dr. Jensen did not present any evidence establishing that he lost any job, position, 
or was denied any work opportunities as a result of the third (Nov. 6, 1996) broadcast. 
To the contrary, following that broadcast he found new work in nursing homes. [R. 6866 
(Jensen) at 98 line 17-99 line 15.] In addition, Dr. Jensen continued to work at the Art 
City Family Medical Center after the November 6, 1996 broadcast, until he voluntarily 
quit that position in 1998. [R. 6867 (Jensen) at 155 lines 7-10.] Dr. Jensen did not claim 
(or prove) that any patient or potential patient (or employer) refused to deal with him as a 
result of anything published in the November 6, 1996 broadcast. Although Dr. Jensen 
testified that his work hours at the Art City Family Medical Center decreased "over 
time," [R. 6855 (Jensen) at 185 line 24-186 line 2; 187 lines 5-8], he offered no 
evidence (other than his own, unsubstantiated statement of belief) that the reason for the 
decrease in hours was any information broadcast by defendants. [R. 6855 (Stuart) at 145 
line 5 - 146 line 11.] No evidence was proffered regarding the amount of decreased time, 
when the alleged decrease occurred, or the amount of economic loss that Dr. Jensen may 
have suffered as a result. [R. 6855 (Jensen) at 185, line 24 - 187, line 13.] 
Summary of Argument 
Dr. Jensen's claims of "false light invasion of privacy" that were premised upon 
the defendants' programs broadcast on September 5, 1995 and June 17, 1996 (which 
claims were pleaded only after defendants had moved to dismiss Dr. Jensen's defamation 
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claims as time-barred) are subject to the same statute of limitations that applies to all 
claims for damage to reputation resulting from allegedly injurious falsehoods, no matter 
what label a plaintiff attaches to such claims. 
The three alternative (and redundant) claims for invasion of Dr. Jensen's personal 
privacy, arising from Sawyers' surreptitious recording of her conversation with Dr. 
Jensen while being professionally treated by him as a patient, are not actionable because 
Dr. Jensen did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
professional care for, and treatment of, Sawyers. 
Similarly, a claim for "invasion of privacy" by being portrayed in a false light 
requires that some private and personal aspect of the plaintiffs life be the subject of the 
false light portrayal. Because all three of defendants' broadcasts focused exclusively on 
Dr. Jensen's conduct as a state licensed and regulated medical professional, he cannot, as 
a matter of law, prevail on a claim for "invasion of his personal privacy." Accordingly, 
the District Court plainly erred in submitting these claims to the jury. 
The District Court also erred when it submitted to the jury (and did not set aside 
the verdict on) Dr. Jensen's claims for defamation and false light because all three of the 
defendants' broadcast reports were substantially true: Dr. Jensen admitted at trial that he 
had prescribed controlled substances to three separate women (Sawyers, Johnson, and 
Katour) without first conducting any meaningful physical examination or medical history 
to rule out contraindications; he also admitted he had instructed Sawyers how to "abuse" 
a drug, and admitted that he made the statements about Dexedrine. The minor 
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inaccuracies in detail that he contends were false did not add to the "sting" of these 
admittedly true facts. Accordingly, the broadcasts are not actionable. 
The jury's award of $1 million in pecuniary damages flowing from the third (Nov. 
6, 1996) broadcast must be vacated because there is a complete lack of evidence that Dr. 
Jensen suffered any economic losses as a result of that broadcast. 
The punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen on the basis of the defendants1 speech 
on a matter of public concern cannot be sustained on appeal because the Court cannot 
find, after independently reviewing the record, that there is clear and convincing evidence 
that defendants entertained serious doubts as to truth of the statements contained in the 
broadcasts. 
Argument 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND SUBMITTED TO THE JURY (AND DID NOT SET ASIDE ITS 
VERDICT ON) DR. JENSEN'S CLAIM FOR FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF 
PRIVACY FOR THE FIRST TWO BROADCASTS, BECAUSE THOSE CLAIMS 
WERE TIME BARRED UNDER THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
The District Court correctly ruled that Dr. Jensen's defamation claims arising from 
the September 5, 1995 and June 17, 1996 broadcasts were time-barred under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-29(4) [R. 1016, 1142], but erred when it ruled the same statute of 
limitations did not bar the false light claims based on the same broadcasts. [R. 4137.] 
As this Court has repeatedly recognized, "the nature of the cause of action, or of 
the right sued upon, and not the form of action, is the test by which to determine which 
statute of limitations applies." Cathco v. Valentiner Crane Brunjes Onyon Architects, 
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944 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 1997); see also Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., 
Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 14 (Utah 1990) (court decides which statute of limitations to apply f,by 
the nature of the action and not by the pleading labels chosen11); Holm v. B & M Service, 
Inc., 661 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1983) (same). 
A false light claim is "'closely allied' with an action for defamation," and the 
same considerations apply to each. Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 
374, 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). As this Court stated in Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, 
Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 907 (Utah 1992), "a false light invasion of privacy claim based on 
defamatory statements [is] governed by the statute of limitations for libel." Id. at 906 n. 
37 {citing Eastwood v. Cascade BrdcsVg Co., 722 P.2d 1295, 1299 (Wash. 1986))11; see 
also West v. Media General Convergence, 53 S.W.3d 640, 648 (Tenn. 2001) (in 
recognizing the false light tort, holding that the statute of limitations for defamation 
applies to that claim, in recognition of the fact that "application of different statutes of 
limitation for false light and defamation cases could undermine the effectiveness oi 
limitations on defamation claims"); Mittleman v. United States, 104 F.3d 410, 415 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (same); Rumbauskas v. Cantor, 649 A.2d 853, 857-58 (N.J. 1994) (same); 
Wagner v. Campbell Cty., Wyo., 695 F. Supp. 512, 517 (D. Wyo. 1988) (same); Meyer 
Land & Cattle Co. v. Lincoln Cty. Conserv'n Dist., 31 P.3d 970, 974 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2001) (same); Gashgaiv. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1983) (same). 
11
 Russell also cites Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1978), which 
holds that the defamation statute of limitations applies to an emotional distress claim 
based on an allegedly libelous report. Id. 
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The purpose of this rule is to prevent the type of procedural manipulation that Dr. 
Jensen perpetrated below - a circumvention of the time limit provided for filing 
defamation claims by simply re-labeling his cause of action. See Eastwood, 722 P.2d at 
1296 ("Where a given set of facts gives rise to a defamation cause of action, it cannot be 
recharacterized as a false light invasion of privacy cause of action for statute of 
limitations purposes'1). If the defamation statute of limitations is not applied to false light 
actions which are essentially defamation actions, the "statute will become meaningless 
because parties will invariably claim a 'false light9 invasion of privacy instead of a 
defamation." Sullivan v. Pulitzer Brdcst'g Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 480 (Mo. 1986); see 
also Heekin v. Columbia Brdcst'g, Inc., 789 So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla. Ct. App.), review 
denied, 799 So.2d 216 (Fla. 2001); Magenis v. Fisher Brdcst'g, Inc., 798 P.2d 1106, 
1109 (Or. Ct. App. 1990). 
In this case, Dr. Jensen's false light claim was based entirely on the broadcast 
statements that served as the basis for his defamation claim,12 see, e.g, R. 3122 ^ 31-41, 
and alleged the same damages as his dismissed defamation claim. Compare R. 3122 
(Second Am. Compl.) Iffl 43-45, with R. 1062 (Am. Compl.) fflj 56, 60. Tellingly, Dr. 
Jensen did not even assert his claim for false light invasion of privacy until after the 
defendants had moved to dismiss his defamation claims as untimely filed, see supra at 5, 
in a transparent effort to resurrect the time-barred defamation claim. Accordingly, Dr. 
Jensen's false light claims based on the September 5, 1995 and June 17, 1996 broadcasts 
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are subject to the statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4), and 
should therefore be dismissed as time-barred. 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, AND DID NOT SET ASIDE ITS 
VERDICT ON, DR. JENSEN'S THREE ALTERNATIVE CLAIMS ASSERTING 
AN INVASION OF HIS PRIVACY 
a. There Was No Intrusion Into Dr. Jensen's Sphere of Personal Privacy. 
To prevail on a claim for intrusion, a plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants 
"intruded into a private place, or otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff 
has thrown about his person or affairs." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652B, cmt. c 
(1977). Dr. Jensen's expectation of privacy in the place alleged to have been intruded 
upon must be a reasonable expectation. Id. The question whether one's expectation of 
privacy is an objectively reasonable one, is one of law, reviewed de novo. In re A.C.C, 
44 P.3d 708, 710 (Utah 2002); see also Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988) 
(holding that plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy against being 
photographed in public place). 
Not only is there a diminished expectation of privacy in the workplace, see e.g. 
Cox, 761 P.2d at 564; Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. American Brdcst'g Cos., 306 
F.3d 806, 818 (9th Cir. 2002); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby 
Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1281 n.20 (Nev. 1995), courts have specifically held that 
audio or video recording of one's business activities conducted in an office open to the 
12
 See Logan v. West Coast Benson Hotel, 981 F. Supp. 1301, 1321 (D. Or. 1997) (when 
a claim characterized as "false light" alleges the same facts as a claim for defamation, 
defamation limitations period applies). 
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public is not an intrusion into one's private sphere, as a matter of law. Berosini, 895 P.2d 
at 1281; Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1382 (D. Kan. 
1996).13 This general rule has been applied to the specific context of medical 
professionals providing care or treatment to members of the public. See J.H. Desnick v. 
American Brdcst'g Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995); Medical Lab., 306 
F.3dat818. 
The evidence presented at trial14 demonstrated, inter alia, that the medical clinic 
was open to the public; Sawyers was invited to the clinic and into the patient examination 
room by Dr. Jensen; Dr. Jensen communicated freely with Sawyers (who he knew was a 
news reporter); he never told her to treat their conversations as "confidential," and she 
was under no obligation to do so.15 Most importantly, the two did not discuss any of Dr. 
Jensen's private affairs; their conversation consisted entirely of a professional medical 
"examination" of, and medical advice to, Sawyers. Under these undisputed facts, as a 
When one offers professional services to members of the public who are complete 
strangers, as was Sawyers to Dr. Jensen, there can be no expectation of privacy in the 
communications the businessperson "voluntarily discloses" in the course of that 
relationship. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). 
14
 See supra at 12 and n.6. 
15
 The patient-physician evidentiary privilege belongs exclusively to the patient, not to 
the physician. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Accordingly, a physician has no reasonable basis to expect that anything he says to the 
patient in the course of his professional services will be or remain "private." See, e.g. 
Commonwealth v. Alexander, 708 A.2d 1251, 1257-58 (Pa. 1998) (plurality opinion); In 
re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 562 (Cal. 1970) (compelled disclosure of patient information 
"does not violate any constitutional privacy rights of the psychotherapist"). Notably, the 
defendants' tendered jury instruction, correctly setting forth this proposition of law [R. 
5116] was refused by Judge Harding. [R. 6844 at 21.] 
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matter of law, Dr. Jensen did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his professional interaction with Ms. Sawyers. See, e.g., Medical Lab., 306 F.3d at 
817-18 (no intrusion where undercover "customers" surreptitiously recorded their 
conversations with medical lab technicians; such conduct did not intrude "into their 
personal lives, intimate relationships, or any other private affairs" of the lab technicians, 
who could have no reasonable expectation of privacy "in the location or contents of the 
conversation"); Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352-53 (no intrusion where surreptitious recording 
of physicians' interaction with "test" patients did not involve "intimate personal facts" 
about physicians and thus there was "no invasion of a legally protected interest in . . . 
privacy"); see also Commonwealth v. Alexander, 708 A.2d 1251, 1257-58 (Pa. 1998) 
(plurality) (doctor has no reasonable expectation of privacy in how he prescribes 
controlled substances to "patients"); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146, 
1H8-49 (9th Cir. 1990) (same).17 
The addition of a hidden camera does not alter this analysis. Under both federal 
and state law, conversations can be recorded with the knowledge and consent of only one 
of the participants. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511; Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-402(2). The analysis 
is the same under the Fourth Amendment where an informant, instead of an undercover 
16
 Because the test is one of objectively reasonable expectations, the proferred testimony 
of Dr. Jensen's professional colleagues' own subjective expectations is irrelevant. 
17
 The trial court's reliance on Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) to 
find that Dr. Jensen had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his professional 
interactions with Sawyers, [R. 6751], is misplaced. Dietemann has been squarely 
rejected by courts that have addressed recordings made in business offices that were open 
to the public in contrast to Dietemann's private practice that he operated out of his home: 
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police officer, does the surreptitious tape recording. See e.g., Alexander, 708 A.2d at 
1257-58 (no violation of a doctor's right of privacy occurred where police informant 
surreptitiously taped his interactions with a doctor in the doctor's office concerning the 
doctor's prescribing practices); Forster, 896 F.2d at 1148-49 (same, with respect to 
undercover law enforcement agents posing as patients). If an agent of the state (for 
example, a DOPL officer) may freely enter a physician's office open to the public and 
conduct surreptitious video or tape recording of business activities conducted there, all 
without a warrant, a private news reporter has all the more justification to engage in 
similar investigations. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353; Berosini, 895 P.2d at 1280-81. As the 
Medical Labs court stated, in words that apply with full force here, "[P]laintiff could have 
no reasonable expectation of limited privacy in a workplace interaction with [a] stranger 
that was purely professional and touched upon nothing private and personal to [the 
1 8 
plaintiff] himself." Id. at 818. Those considerations resonate strongly in this case, 
where KTVX's investigation centered upon allegations of significant misconduct against 
a physician who was all too willing to prescribe powerful and addictive stimulant 
amphetamines to first-time, walk-in patients, posing a substantial risk to the public's 
health and safety. Just as the defendants had done in Desnick and Medical Laboratory, 
Sawyers obtained access to Dr. Jensen's medical facilities seeking professional care and 
"Dietemann was not in business, and did not advertise his services or charge for them. 
His quackery was private" Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352-53 (emphasis added). 
18
 See also Sundheim v. Board of Cty. Cornm'rs, 904 P.2d 1337, 1351 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1995), offd, 1996 WL 617372 (Colo. 1996) ("when an intrusion into a commercial 
establishment is based upon the nature of the business activities there taking place . . . the 
business owner may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those activities"). 
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treatment as a member of the general public (although Sawyers did not conceal the fact 
that she was a journalist). In Desnick and Medical Laboratory, the courts found, as a 
matter of law, that under these circumstances no intrusion upon the defendant's solitude 
or seclusion had occurred. The same is true in this case. 
b. The Jury Should Not Have Been Allowed to Determine Whether 
Defendants' Actions Were "Highly Offensive" 
The trial court must make a threshold determination of offensiveness as a basis for 
the existence of a cause of action for intrusion. Stien, 944 P.2d at 378. To satisfy this 
threshold showing, the defendants' conduct must amount to more than poor taste or 
judgment; the requisite "offensiveness" is "an exceptional kind of prying into another's 
private affairs." Medical Lab., 306 F.3d at 819 (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) TORTS § 652B); Stien, 944 P.2d at 378. Based upon facts similar to those 
involved in Desnick and Medical Laboratory, this case did not meet the Stien threshold 
standard. In the present case, as in Desnick, despite the fact that surreptitious recording 
took place, "[n]o embarrassingly intimate details of anybody's life were publicized . . . 
[tjhere was no eavesdropping on a private conversation; the testers recorded their own 
conversations with the . . . physicians." Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Medical Laboratory, where a reporter interviewed and surreptitiously taped 
plaintiff about medical testing that affects the health and safety of the public, the court 
determined that, as a matter of law, the defendant's conduct could not be deemed "highly 
offensive": "The covert videotaping of a business conversation among strangers in 
business offices does not rise to the level of an exceptional prying into another's private 
30 
affairs." Medical Lab., 306 F.3d at 819-20. Accordingly, the jury should not have been 
permitted to render an opinion whether defendants9 conduct was "highly offensive." 
c. Dr. Jensen Also Did Not Establish That Defendants Violated Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-402(l)(a) or (b) 
Judge Harding erred when he submitted to the jury (and refused to set aside its 
verdict on) Dr. Jensen's claims under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-402(1 )(a) & (b). Section 
76-9-402(1 )(b) is inapplicable because the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that 
Sawyers did not "install" any device in a "private place." Even if carrying a recording 
device on one's person could be deemed to "install a device," as demonstrated above, the 
patient examination room within the FirstMed Clinic is not a "private place" as defined 
by section 76-9-401(1). Although it may be a "private place" from the vantage point of a 
patient who is examined therein, Dr. Jensen, a licensed professional physician, is not a 
person "entitled to privacy there," whose consent was needed to "install" the recording 
device. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-402(1 )(b); see, e.g., Forster, 896 F.2d at 1148-49; Cox, 
761 P.2d at 564; Medical Lab., 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1188. 
Similarly, by its own terms, section 76-9-402(1 )(a) cannot apply here. Under that 
section, one must "trespass" on property with the intent to "eavesdrop," or to conduct 
"other surveillance in a private place." Even if it could be said that Sawyers 
"trespass [ed]" on property when she entered the patient examination room upon 
invitation and consent of Dr. Jensen (which is not a "trespass"), as a matter of law 
Sawyers did not "eavesdrop" as that term is defined by section 76-9-401, since she was a 
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party to the conversation recorded. Therefore, she cannot be found to have "trespassed 
with the intent to eavesdrop" on her own conversation. In addition, for the reasons stated 
above, the patient examination room is not a "private place" from the vantage point of 
Dr. Jensen, so Sawyers could not, as a matter of law, be found to have "trespassed with 
the intent to subject another person to . . . surveillance in a private place." 
For the reasons stated above, the Court should vacate the judgment below on each 
of the three alternative "invasion of privacy by intrusion," and statutory privacy claims 
and order that judgment be entered on those claims in favor of defendants. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY DR. JENSEN'S CLAIMS FOR FALSE LIGHt 
INVASION OF PRIVACY ON THE BASIS OF THE DEFENDANTS' 
BROADCASTS THAT FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY ON DR. JENSEN'S 
PERFORMANCE IN HIS PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY AS A STATE-
LICENSED AND REGULATED PHYSICIAN 
To even reach this question (with respect to the first two broadcasts), the Court 
must first find that Dr. Jensen's claim for false light invasion of privacy is subject to the 
four-year statute of limitations instead of the one-year statute applicable to defamation 
claims. And, the Court may not find the four-year statute applicable unless it determines 
that the claim for invasion of privacy protects a right or interest separate and distinct from 
"Eavesdrop" means "to overhear, record, amplify, or transmit any part of a wire or oral 
communication of others without the consent of at least one party thereto by means of 
any electronic, mechanical or other device." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-401(2) (emphasis 
added). 
Finally, judgment should also be entered in favor of United Television on this claim 
due to the obvious confusion of the jury. The jury found that Sawyers did not violate § 
76-9-402(1 )(a), but that United Television (her employer) did violate this section. [See 
R. 5771.] Of course, United Television could only act through its agent, Sawyers. 
Accordingly, it is impossible to reconcile those verdicts. 
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damage to one's reputation, i.e., the right ofprivacy. See, e.g., Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 
556, 563-64 & n.7 (Utah 1988). However, it is undisputed that all three of the 
defendants' broadcasts focused exclusively upon Dr. Jensen's public conduct as a 
licensed professional medical care provider. In other words, none of his "private" 
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conduct was the subject of the defendants' broadcasts. Under these circumstances, as a 
matter of law, Dr. Jensen cannot state a claim for violation of his personal right to 
privacy. Accordingly, the multi-million dollar judgment here, which is premised upon a 
non-cognizable cause of action, clearly constitutes a "manifest injustice," which amounts 
to plain error. See, e.g., State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993) (finding 
reversible plain error where defendant may be subject to criminal penalties "for a crime 
which is not recognized in Utah"); see also Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
R.R. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (reversible plain error found where case 
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submitted to jury without objection resulted in "miscarriage of justice" or was "patently 
plainly erroneous and prejudicial"). 
This Court has recognized that common law torts that redress an "invasion of 
privacy," protect "an individual's interest in being let alone." Russell v. Thomson 
Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 906 (Utah 1992); Cox, 761 P.2d at 563-64 & n.7; see 
21
 "[Allegations of misconduct against a local doctor . . . are certainly matters of public 
concern." Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 902 (Utah 1992); see also 
Lee v. Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognizing "the public concern 
in policing failures in the medical profession"). 
99 
Although defendants did not expressly argue below that Dr. Jensen could not bring a 
"false light invasion of privacy" claim based upon broadcasts focusing on his 
professional conduct as a physician, defendants did argue that Jensen lacked any 
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also R. 6754, 6764 (trial court's ruling that "[t]he false light claim protects the plaintiffs 
privacy interests invaded by the broadcasts.") (emphasis added). "In order to be 
actionable, an action for false light [invasion of privacy] must involve the private affairs 
of the subject, and cannot relate to any matter which is inherently 'public' or 'of 
legitimate interest to the public.'" 62A AM. JUR. 2D, Privacy § 126 at 734-35. It is for 
this reason that courts have held that publication of information concerning the discharge 
of a public official's duties or of an individual's performance of professional services 
cannot give rise to a claim for false light "invasion of privacy." See, e.g., Patton v. Royal 
Indus., Inc., 70 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (Ct. App. 1968) (affirming dismissal of false light claim 
where there was no "statement of fact relative to [the plaintiffs] private lives or any other 
secret matter . . . [the challenged statements] reflected exclusively upon the professional 
standing of the plaintiffs in the public view. There was no invasion of the rights of 
privacy."); Parano v. O'Connor, 641 A.2d 607, 610 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (dismissing 
false light claim brought by hospital administrator on basis of statements critical of his 
administration of the hospital because the statements concerned his public image as a 
public figure); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781 (Ariz. 1989) 
(holding that there can be no false light invasion of privacy claim premised upon 
publication focusing on discharge of public officials' duties); Hagler v. Democrat-News, 
Inc., 699 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (same); see also Estill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 
186F.2d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 1951) ("It is the unwarranted publicizing of a person's 
cognizable privacy interest in his professional conduct within the patient examination 
room. [See, e.g., R. 2741, 2959-2963; 5701, 5722-5724.] 
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private affairs and activities which furnishes the basis for the cause of action.") (emphasis 
added); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652D at 386 (1977) ("nor is [a person's] 
privacy invaded when the defendant gives publicity to a business or activity in which the 
plaintiff is engaged in dealing with the public"). 
"Some factual situations so clearly and unquestionably do not result in an invasion 
of privacy that the courts should so declare as a matter of law." Langworthy v. Pulitzer 
PubVg Co., 368 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Mo. 1963). Here, this Court should declare that as a 
matter of law a licensed physician has no expectation of privacy in how he conducts his 
professional duties that directly affect the public's health and safety. As the United 
States Supreme Court has stated, "insofar as his professional career is involved, [the 
plaintiff] is substantially without a right to privacy." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386 
(1967) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Individuals who work in highly regulated 
areas of commerce have a lower expectation of privacy in connection to their work-
related activities in those areas. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) 
(an expectation of privacy "is particularly attenuated in commercial property employed in 
'closely regulated' industries"). 
Because each of the broadcasts that form the basis of Dr. Jensen's claims was 
directed exclusively at Dr. Jensen's performance of his professional duties, and did not 
Similarly, case law decided under the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7)(c), has recognized that information in government's hands is not exempt 
from disclosure as "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" when the information 
"relat[es] to business judgments and relationships," even where the "disclosure might 
tarnish someone's professional reputation." Washington Post Co. v. United States Depyt 
of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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involve any matters that can reasonably be considered personal and "private" to him, as a 
matter of law he cannot prevail on a claim for "invasion of privacy." To permit a 
plaintiff to recover a multi-million dollar judgment premised on a legal claim that is "not 
warranted under the law," Pridgin v. Wilkinson, 296 F.2d 74, 76 (10th Cir. 1961), would 
"seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings/' and 
is thus plain error. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 
1516 (10th Cir. 1984). 
4. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND PERMITTED THE JURY TO CONSIDER (AND DID NOT 
SET ASIDE THE VERDICT ON) DR. JENSEN'S CLAIMS FOR DEFAMATION 
AND FALSE LIGHT BECAUSE DEFENDANTS' BROADCASTS WERE 
SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE 
To meet his burden of proving falsity, Dr. Jensen must show that the "substance, 
the gist" of the matter is untrue. See Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286, 290-91 
(Utah 1984) ("Insignificant inaccuracies . . . are immaterial, providing that the 
defamatory charge is true in substance.") (citation omitted); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 
812 P.2d at 49, 57-58 (Utah 1991) (same); MUJI 10.4 ("A statement is considered to be 
true if it is substantially true or that the gist of the statement is true.").24 The test is 
whether the publication as a whole "produces a different effect upon the reader than that 
which would be produced by the literal truth of the matter." Anderson v. Cramlet, 789 
F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir. 1986). The United States Supreme Court embraced this test as 
24
 Substantial truth is also a complete defense to a false light claim. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, cmt. a (1977); see also Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 
(Utah 1988); Stien, 944 P.2d at 380 (false light claim is closely allied with defamation 
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mandated by the First Amendment in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 
516-17(1991): 
it is sufficient if the substance of the charge be proved true, irrespective of 
slight inaccuracy in the details . . . inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so 
long as the "substance, the gist, the sting of the libelous charge be 
justified." Put another way, the statement is not considered false unless it 
"would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the 
pleaded truth would have produced." 
In short, a minor inaccuracy that does not materially alter the "gist" of the 
allegation is not actionable, because it is "substantially true." See, e.g., Schwartz v. 
American College of Emergency Physicians, 215 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) 
(statement accusing plaintiff of "stock fraud" was substantially true, although he had only 
been accused of making deceptive statements that adversely affected stock price); 
Anderson, 789 F.2d at 843-45 (statement that plaintiff father had "kidnapped" his child 
was substantially true where he conceded he did not have custodial parent's consent to 
take the child); Gilbert v. Ben-Asher, 900 F.2d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir. 1990) (where Board 
of Medical Examiners had adjudged plaintiff incompetent, it was substantially true to 
report statement by director of board of medical examiners that plaintiff "was a menace 
to the health and safety of the people of Arizona"). 
In each of the cases cited above, the court held that the "gist" or "sting" of the 
alleged libel was the general accusation of fault or wrongdoing, not the precise details 
subsidiary to the general charge. See Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 310-12 (2d Cir. 
1986) (statements "should not be actionable if they merely imply the same view, and are 
claim and the same considerations apply to each); Sack on Defamation § 12.3.1 at 12-18 
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simply an outgrowth of and subsidiary to those claims upon which . . . there can be no 
recovery"); Church of Scientology Int'I v. Time Warner, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 589, 594 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Nicholson v. Promoters on Listings, 159 F.R.D. 343, 355 (D. 
Mass. 1994) (same). Significantly, these determinations were made as a matter of law. 
Here, while some of the defendants' published statements may not have been 
literally true (e.g., Dr. Jensen had not literally "promised" Sawyers he'd prescribe 
Dexedrine for her if Phen-Fen did not work ), the "gist" and "sting" of the broadcasts as 
(2001). 
A more accurate description of this "promise" would have been to describe it as an 
"offer." See infra n.26 (quoting DOPL Petition). However, Jensen's "willingfness]" to 
"work with" Sawyers in prescribing Dexedrine on July 27, 1995 cannot be seriously 
questioned. Although Dr. Jensen broached the subject subtly using the word "maybe," by 
the end of the conversation he made clear that if the patient was willing to "just say [she 
is] tired," he would prescribe Dexedrine for narcolepsy, as he had done for others in the 
past. [Def s. Ex. 99 at 2-3.] Nor does the fact that Dr. Jensen on a later date recanted 
that "offer," after realizing he'd been "caught" in the earlier exchange in which he 
declared his willingness to document a false diagnosis to support an illegal prescription, 
in any way alter the "gist or sting" of the description of the earlier candid interaction. 
More importantly, the defendants' third broadcast provided the audience with video of 
Dr. Jensen making the statement that allegedly constituted a "promise," so that 
defendants' characterization was "opinion" that the viewer could evaluate against Dr. 
Jensen's own words. See Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282, 289, 292 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(statement of opinion premised upon fully disclosed facts is not actionable); accord 
Reddickv. Craig, 719 P.2d 340, (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
TORTS § 566 cmt. c & Illustr. 4 & 5 (1977). 
In addition, use of the term "illegal" to describe Dr. Jensen's offer of Dexedrine is 
accurate because conduct in violation of state laws and regulations is accurately described 
as "illegal." See, e.g., Price v. Walters, 918 P.2d 1370, 1376-78 (Okla. 1996) (finding 
report that plaintiff had violated federal regulations was "substantially accurate" where 
challenged press release stated that "[Plaintiff] Broke Law"). Utah's Administrative 
Code regulations have the force of law. See V-l Oil Co. v. Department ofEnvtl. Quality, 
904 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Horton v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 842 P.2d 
928, 932 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Moreover, physicians have been convicted under federal 
drug laws for prescribing controlled substances without conducting physical exams or 
taking medical histories. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); United 
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a whole - that Dr. Jensen prescribed controlled substances without performing a thorough 
physical examination or taking a medical history, (and having indicated that he was 
willing to give Sawyers a false diagnosis such as narcolepsy because he fully 
understood and appreciated that Dexedrine was "technically not legal" for weight loss 
9*7 
therapy) - was uncontrovertibly substantially truthful. 
Moreover, the facts that Dr. Jensen admitted at trial but were not broadcast, 
demonstrate conclusively that the "crux" of the broadcasts as a whole - their gist or sting 
- was substantially true. Dr. Jensen admitted that: 
• in addition to writing the Phen-Fen prescription for Sawyers, he also, 
that same day, wrote out an identical prescription to his assistant, 
Sandra Peterson Katour, without conducting any physical 
examination, medical history, or ruling out contraindications [see 
supra at 14]; 
• he had written a Fastin prescription for Lisa Johnson, a non-patient 
of his, also without conducting any physical examination, medical 
history, or ruling out contraindications [see supra at 8-9]29; 
States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 192 (9th Cir. 1975) (doctor convicted of distributing 
controlled substances when he prescribed Dexedrine without performing physical 
examinations); United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181, 182 (10th Cir. 1977). 
As the DOPL put it, the hidden camera footage established that Dr. Jensen had "offered 
to prescribe a controlled substance for a condition that is contrary to its indicated use and 
suggested his willingness to make an unsubstantiated diagnosis to support that 
prescription." See PL's Ex. 38 at 6 (Tf 11) (emphasis added). 
7
 Dr. Jensen not only acknowledged his awareness of this fact during the July 27, 1995 
interaction with Sawyers, he had also stated in his prior phone conversation with Sawyers 
that "Dexedrine technically is illegal to, uh, use as a diet pill." [Defs.? Ex. 93 at 4.] 
28
 For purposes of defeating a claim for libel, it is immaterial when the true facts become 
known or are discovered. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1228 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that truthful publications are not actionable, "[a]nd it makes no 
difference that the true facts were unknown until the trial"). 
29
 In contrast to Sawyers, whose blood pressure had been taken by a nurse, neither Katour 
nor Johnson were checked for high blood pressure, accelerated pulse, or any other "vital 
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• he had suggested and demonstrated to Sawyers how to open the 
time-release capsules of Fastin and to grind the granules on her teeth 
that in his own words, was "a way of abusing" this drug, [see supra 
at 13] 
Thus, the facts that Dr. Jensen admitted were true are as damaging to his 
reputation as the broadcast allegations that he contends were false. See, e.g., Brehany, 
812 P.2d at 58 (holding that two plaintiffs had "admitted at trial that they had used illegal 
drugs" and that "[tjhese admissions justified the trial court's dismissal of their defamation 
claims"); accordLindemuth v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-l, 765 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Colo. 
App. 1988) ("plaintiffs sworn . . . testimony constitute^] an admission of the substantial 
truth of the allegedly defamatory statements."). In sum, the broadcasts are not actionable 
because they did not "make [Dr. Jensen] significantly worse off than a completely or 
literally truthful publication would have." Pope v. Chronicle PubVg Co., 95 F.3d 607, 
613 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); see also Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 
1222, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Falsehoods that do not harm the plaintiffs reputation more 
than a full recital of the true facts about him would do are . . . not actionable." ). 
signs." Notably, Dr. Jensen did not claim that these other woman told him they 
desperately needed to lose weight, or they could lose their jobs (as he claimed he 
understood about Sawyers). Nor did he claim that they did not permit him to conduct a 
physical examination (as he claimed with respect to Sawyers). 
0
 Moreover, during his closing arguments, Dr. Jensen's counsel conceded that "Dr. 
Jensen prescribed diet medications too freely." [R. 6858 (Gardner) at 12 lines 23-24.] 
See United States v. Bentson, 947 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1991) (statements of counsel 
in closing arguments constitute judicial admissions that are binding on his client); Larson 
v. A.T.S.L, 859 P.2d 273, 275-76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (same). 
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5. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT SET ASIDE THE 
JUDGMENT ON DR. JENSEN'S CLAIMS FOR ECONOMIC DAMAGES 
ALLEGEDLY FLOWING FROM THE DEFENDANTS' THIRD BROADCAST 
"The fact of damages must be proven with reasonable certainty and the amount by 
a reasonable though not necessarily precise estimate." Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 
P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986). Damages in tort must be predicated on a factual and legal 
connection ("proximate cause") between the wrongful act or acts of defendants and the 
damage incurred. See Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598, 600 (Utah App. 
1995); Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1989). 
Here, the jury awarded Dr. Jensen $1 million in pecuniary damages on the basis of 
the third (November 6, 1996) broadcast alone. [R. 5782.] However, there was no 
evidence demonstrating that Dr. Jensen had suffered any economic losses as a result of 
that broadcast. The evidence of Dr. Jensen's economic damages at trial was based almost 
entirely on the change of Dr. Jensen's medical practice from family to nursing home 
practice, which occurred, according to Dr. Jensen and his experts, as a result of Dr. 
Jensen's loss of IHC Health Plans privileges in September 1995, more than a year prior 
to the November 6, 1996 broadcast. When asked about the basis for his economic 
damages, Dr. Jensen testified: "The key one is that I don't have IHC insurance privilege 
and I cannot work in the family practice any more because of t h a t . . . . " [R. 6856 
(Jensen) at 29 lines 2-5; R. 6866 at 103.] Dr. Jensen further testified that his lack of IHC 
As further indication of the irrationality of the jury's verdict on this claim, the jury 
found defendants had tortiously interfered with Dr. Jensen's prospective contractual 
relations by broadcasting the November 6, 1996 report [R. 5761], but it awarded Dr. 
Jensen no pecuniary losses as a result of that purported interference. Id. 
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Health Plan insurance privileges limits where he can work, and because he does not have 
such privileges, he is limited to nursing home work or similar work for which he can bill 
Medicare and Medicaid. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 101 lines 8-15; 103 lines 16-20.] 
Similarly, Dr. Jensen's economic expert Frank Stuart testified that Dr. Jensen 
suffered lost income as a result of the change in his medical practice from family practice 
to nursing homes, that occurred in September, 1995, [R. 6850 (Stuart) at 144 lines 12-14; 
144 lines 12-14; 145 lines 4-9; Id. at 57 line 25-58 line 10] as a direct result of Dr. 
Jensen's being removed from IHC insurance panels at that time. [R. 6867 (Jensen) at 156 
lines 10-18.] L. Deane Smith similarly testified that the basis for Dr. Jensen's economic 
damages was the "substantial change" in the nature of Dr. Jensen's medical practice, and 
he specifically identified September, 1995 as the starting point for comparing Dr. 
Jensen's actual versus expected income. [R. 6850 (Smith) at 163 line 13-164 line 22; 165 
lines 14-23; 168 lines 9-21.] In sum, all of Dr. Jensen's experts based their economic 
damage calculations on the substantial change in the nature of Dr. Jensen's practice (from 
general/family practice to nursing home practice) that was occasioned by his loss of IHC 
Health Plans privileges in September 1995, over a year before the broadcast that is at 
issue here. 
Dr. Jensen produced no evidence that he was rejected from a job as a result of the 
November 6, 1996 broadcast, that IHC refused to reinstate him as a result of the 
broadcast, or that he suffered any other economic harm due to that broadcast. (Although 
In contrast, Dr. Jensen testified that he was fired from the IHC FirstMed Clinic in 
September 1995 [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 33 -34] and by the IHC WorkMed clinic in June, 
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Dr. Jensen did testify regarding some negative events which may have occurred after 
November 6, 1996, i.e. that his work hours at Art City Family Medical Center decreased 
"over time," [R. 6855 (Jensen) at 187], he produced no evidence that such effects 
occurred, if at all, because o/the November 6, 1996 broadcast. [R. 6855 (Stuart) at 145 
line 5 - 146 line 11; R. 6848 (Rosen) at 88 lines 4-12; 118 line 1-6.)]33 See, e.g., 
Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521-22 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(rejecting the "fallacy" of "assuming a causal connection between two events merely 
because one follows the other" because such "reasoning is not a reasonable inference but 
is mere speculation and conjecture" and requiring direct proof of causal link between 
actionable defamation and claimed economic losses). 
In sum, Dr. Jensen produced no evidence that anything occurred subsequent to the 
November 6, 1996 broadcast—much less that anything occurred because of that 
broadcast—which had any demonstrable effect on his future income stream. Under these 
circumstances, as a matter of law, the third broadcast cannot be deemed to have caused 
the economic damages Dr. Jensen claims to have suffered a result of the third broadcast. 
See Gardner v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc., 166 P.2d 196, 196 (Utah 1946) (finding 
no basis to award lost profits damages where plaintiff had abandoned business venture 
prior to the defendant's acts); see also Gould v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 309 
1996. Id. at 67 lines 4 -21] 
To meet their burden of marshalling the evidence, defendants can only point to the 
testimony that Dr. Jensen cited in his post-trial brief to support this portion of the 
judgment (none of which establishes that economic losses were caused by the Nov. 6, 
1996 broadcast): [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 112 line 21-114 line 21; R. 6855 at 185 line 24, 
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P.2d 802, 806 (Utah 1957) ("proof of loss of profits must not be completely speculative 
nor uncertain as to fact.. .") (emphasis added). 
Because the jury's economic damages award on the November 6, 1996 broadcast 
is wholly lacking in evidentiary support, the Court should vacate the jury's award of 
economic damages on that broadcast. 
6. THE JURY'S AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES ON THE DEFAMATION 
AND FALSE LIGHT CLAIMS MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
FINDING NOR CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE 
DEFENDANTS PUBLISHED THE STATEMENTS AT ISSUE WITH 
CONSTITUTIONAL ACTUAL MALICE 
Before punitive damages may be awarded against a media defendant on the basis 
of speech on a matter of public concern,34 there must be a finding, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the defendant published false and defamatory statements either 
while knowing that the statements were false or while entertaining serious doubts as to 
their truth. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (stating that without 
such a rule, "jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the 
danger of media self-censorship"); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 
472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985); see also MUJI 10.12. On appeal, such a finding is subject to 
de novo review, under the Court's constitutional duty to conduct an "independent 
appellate review" of the evidence of actual malice. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 285 (1964). 
187 line 13; R. 6856 at 28 line 25-29 line 9. But see R. 6856 (Jensen) at 27 line 12-28 
line 6 (testifying that aforementioned damages flowed from first broadcast).] 
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The evidence presented below cannot support a finding that the defendants 
published any of the allegedly false and defamatory statements while knowing the 
statements to be false or while entertaining serious doubts as to their truth.35 Notably, in 
its post-verdict ruling, the trial court found that there was evidence of common law 
malice, e.g., "willfulness and excessive publication," [R. 6749, 6762, 6764], but did not 
point to any evidence (and certainly not "clear and convincing" evidence) to satisfy the 
constitutional standard of "knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." See Cox 
v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 n.3 (Utah 1988) (discussing difference between common law 
and constitutional forms of "actual malice"). 
See supra n. 21. 
Moreover, the trial court did not adequately instruct the jury that this was what they 
were required to find in order to award punitive damages. [See R. 6841 (Instr. 67).] The 
trial court merely instructed the jury it must find that defendants "published a defamatory 
falsehood about Dr. Jensen knowing it was false or in reckless disregard of whether it 
was true." Id. No further instruction was given, as had been requested by defendants [R. 
5134], into the meaning of "reckless disregard of the truth." But see MUJI 10.12 
Comments (stating that if the plaintiff is a private figure "an instruction on the meaning 
of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard would be necessary. ") (emphasis added); see 
also MUJI 10.7 (providing a 466-word definition of "Knowing Falsehood or Reckless 
Disregard as to Truth or Falsity). The magnitude of this omission cannot be overstated. 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the term "actual malice" "can confuse as well as 
enlighten." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine Co., 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1991). As now-
Justice Ginsburg explained while still a Circuit Court judge, "the risk is considerable that 
jurors will not comprehend the difference between reckless disregard and mere neglect or 
carelessness, or will confuse or blend the separate issues of falsity and actual malice." 
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see 
also Wynn v. Smith, 16 P.3d 424, 431 (Nev. 2001) (finding reversible error injury 
instruction that defined actual malice as requiring only doubts, not "serious doubts" as to 
truth). Since the issue in this appeal is whether there is sufficient (clear and convincing) 
evidence to support a finding of actual malice, the trial judge's error in instructing the 
jury means that the jury's verdict on this issue is entitled to no weight by this Court. 
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Similarly, all of the evidence that Dr. Jensen proffered to establish the defendants' 
alleged "recklessness" focused exclusively on the common law form of "recklessness," 
meaning a high degree of carelessness, sloppiness, or "an extreme departure from the 
standards of investigating and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." 
MUJI 10.7 (stating unequivocally that such conduct does not satisfy the legal definition 
of "actual malice," which requires, instead, "a finding that the defendant had a high 
degree of awareness that the statements] was probably false, but went ahead and 
published the statement anyway.") Dr. Jensen's reliance upon the fact that defendants 
purportedly used "duplicity" and "surreptitious" methods to "trap" him (and thereby 
"expose" his violations of state laws and regulations) is completely unavailing to 
establish "actual malice;" that standard focuses solely on "the defendant's attitude . . . 
toward the truth or falsity of the material published" and not his "attitude toward the 
plaintiffs privacy" or reputation. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252 
(1974) (emphasis added). 
The following evidence might be pointed to in support a finding of knowing 
falsity or reckless disregard of the truth : 
(1) defendants published the statement that Jensen had "promised [Sawyers] 
illegal drugs" even though the offer of Dexedrine was not an iron-clad promise, 
and, furthermore, prior to the first broadcast, Jensen had told Sawyers that he'd 
"found that that we cannot do . . . [it's] not a possibility now for weight loss." 
PL's Ex. 37 at 6. 
™ [See, e.g., R. 6393, 6427, 6398-6400.] 
"XI 
The evidence arguably in support of such a finding is set forth here pursuant to the 
appellants' burden to marshal such evidence. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
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However, Sawyers believed her report was accurate because she had caught Jensen on 
tape offering her a drug that she knew (and confirmed with DOPL) was illegal to 
prescribe for weight loss [R. 6845 (Sawyers) at 46 lines 9-18], and this confirmed 
Jensen's statements, from their earlier phone conversation, that he was willing to "work 
with her" in prescribing Dexedrine; the fact that Jensen later reneged on this promise, 
after learning that he had been caught, did cause her to doubt or change her belief in the 
truth of that statement. [R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 173; 11/20 at 15 -16.] 
(2) Sawyers reported that Jensen "never asked me if I have high blood pressure," 
even though her videotape showed that Jensen's nurse had taken her blood 
pressure. R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 164 lines 17-23. Also, the statement "He gave me 
prescriptions . . . without weighing me or giving me a physical" was knowingly 
false because Dr. Jensen intended to perform a physical examination but was 
prevented from doing so when Sawyers left the clinic abruptly. 
However, Sawyers believed her statements were true because Dr. Jensen never inquired 
about her history of blood pressure or whether she was on medications that lower blood 
pressure. [R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 167-68.] Actual malice is not proven unless defendant is 
shown to have been aware of probable falsity of the gist of a report, not the false but 
subsidiary details contained therein. See Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 312 (2d Cir. 
1986); Nicholson v. Promoters On Listings, 159 F.R.D. 343, 355 (D. Mass. 1994). In 
addition, it was undisputed that Dr. Jensen did give Sawyers the prescriptions before he 
weighed her or performed a physical examination. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 194 lines 10 -
12.]. Moreover, Sawyers refuted Dr. Jensen's new claim, see supra n. 6, that she left the 
clinic abruptly and prevented him from performing a physical examination [R. 6847 
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(Sawyers) at 102; Id. at 182-184], so there was no evidence that she believed that 
statement was untrue. 
(3) The first broadcast could be viewed as suggesting that Lynette Singleton had 
obtained her diet pills from Dr. Jensen, when Sawyers knew that she had not. [R. 
6866 (Jensen) at 54 lines 18-21.] 
However, Sawyers testified that she did not believe she was creating the false impression 
that Singleton was a patient of Dr. Jensen [R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 108, 156-57; R. 6845 at 
45 lines 10-23], and the record does not demonstrate otherwise. Actual malice cannot 
be shown unless the defendant had actual knowledge that a particularly defamatory 
implication would be conveyed by the broadcast and intended to convey that implication. 
Newton v. NationalBrdcst'g Co., 930 F.2d 662, 686 (9th Cir. 1990); Dixon v. Ogden 
Newspapers, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 237 (W. Va. 1992). 
(4) The third broadcast suggested that Dr. Jensen was one of the physicians 
included in the book Questionable Doctors, when Sawyers knew that he was not 
listed in that book. [R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 129.] 
However, that broadcast did not state that Dr. Jensen was listed in the book at that time; 
instead, it pointed viewers to two sources for finding doctors against whom the DOPL 
had filed a petition: the book and the DOPL website, where Jensen was listed. [See 
Defs.' Ex. 263; R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 124.] Moreover, it was undisputed that Jensen was 
included in the subsequent editions of the book Questionable Doctors. [See R. 6864 
(Sawyers) at 168-70.] 
(5) The studio "lead-in" to the third report stated "What would you do if you 
found out your doctor was passing out drugs to addicts?" which Dr. Jensen 
maintained was directed at him. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 95, lines 21-25.] 
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In fact, that broadcast featured another doctor, Sherman Johnson, who, as described in the 
broadcast, "was sent to jail for giving a patient [who was an addict] a lethal dose of 
Demerol." [R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 127.] Thus, neither Sawyers, nor the studio anchor 
who delivered the studio lead-in, believed that that statement referred to Dr. Jensen and 
thus was false. 
(6) The third broadcast again stated that Dr. Jensen had been "caught on tape 
promising me illegal drugs for weight loss", and Sawyers knew that he had not 
made any such "promise," and had since reneged on the "promise" in any case. 
Sawyers' well-founded belief in the truth of her statement is shown by the record. [See 
R. 6847 (Sawyers) at 173; R. 6845 at 15-16; R. 6864 at 152 lines 16-20;] see also supra 
n.25. 
(7) Both the second broadcast's statement that "DOPL is going after the license of 
a Utah doctor," and the third broadcasts statements "Dr. Jensen is still practicing," 
and "The State will allow Jensen to keep his license" suggested that Dr. Jensen's 
medical license had been placed in jeopardy by the DOPL Petition, but Sawyers 
knew (only after the second broadcast), that DOPL was not seeking to revoke his 
license. R. 6862 (Allred) at 99-100; R. 6845 (Sawyers) at 13-14, 18. 
However, the second broadcast was based on the allegations in the DOPL Petition alone, 
which stated that DOPL had the authority to "revoke, suspend, restrict, [or] place on 
probation" a doctor's license. See supra at 18. There is certainly no actual malice in 
relying upon an official record. St Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-33 
(1968). The third broadcast's statement that Dr. Jensen was "still practicing" conveyed 
that the DOPL disciplinary process took a long time (a point specifically addressed on 
camera by Dr. George Van Komen, and, like the statement, "the State will allow Jensen 
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to keep his license/' is not false; accordingly these statements cannot be the basis for a 
finding of actual malice. 
In sum, upon completing its constitutionally-mandated independent review of the 
record, this Court must conclude that there is no evidence -much less "clear and 
convincing" evidence"— that the defendants actually harbored any doubts, much less 
serious doubts, that Dr. Jensen was willing to dispense (and did dispense) controlled 
substances for weight loss in violation of state laws and regulations. Accordingly, the 
jury's award of punitive damages on the basis of the defendants' broadcasts must be 
vacated. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, defendants respectfully ask that the Court find that 
the judgment entered below cannot stand and order that the case be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
50 
FAEGRE & BENSON LLP 
Xiw. b 
Thomas B. Kelley 
Steven D. Zansberg 
370 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2500 
Denver, CO 80202 
Telephone: (303) 607-3500 
VAN COTT BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY, P.C. 
Robert M. Anderson (#0108) 
Jennifer K. Anderson (#7458) 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0340 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS 
MARY SAWYERS AND KTVX-TV 
51 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the within and 
foregoing Appellants' OPENING BRIEF to be hand delivered, this ^ L*day of March, 
2003, to the following: 
Wesley F. Sine 
IBM Building Suite 355 
420 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dale F. Gardiner, Esq. 
Parry Anderson & Mansfield 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 





Constitution of the United States of America, Amend. 1 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
Addendum 2 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I Sec. 15 
Section 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press - Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the 
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; 
and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was 
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the 
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. 
1896 
Addendum 3 
Utah Code Annotated 45-2-3 
45-2-3. Privileged Publication or Broadcast Defined. 
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall not be considered as libelous or 
slanderous per se, is one made: 
(1) In the proper discharge of an official duty. 
(2) In any publication or broadcast of or any statement made in any legislative 
or judicial proceeding, or in any other official proceeding authorized by law. 
(3) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, by one 
who is also interested, or by one who stands in such relation to the person interested as to 
afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication innocent, or 
who is requested by the person interested to give the information. 
(4) By a fair and true report, without malice, of a judicial, legislative, or other 
public official proceeding, or of anything said in the course thereof, or of a charge or 
complaint made by any person to a public official, upon which a warrant shall have been 
issued or an arrest made. 
(5) By a fair and true report, without malice, of the proceedings of a public 
meeting, if such meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the 
public, or the publication or broadcast of the matter complained of was for the public 
benefit. 
Utah Code Annotated 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A) 
58-37-4. Schedule of controlled substances - Schedule I through V - Findings 
required - Specific substances included in schedules 
(2) Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V consist of the following drags or other 
substances by the official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name 
designated: 
(b) Schedule II: 
(iii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any 
material, compound, mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of the 
following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system: 
(A) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its optical 
isomers; 
Utah Code Annotated 76-9-401(1) & (2); 76-9-402(l)(a) & (b) 
76-9-401, Definitions 
For purposes of this part: 
(1) "Private place" means a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe 
from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance. 
(2) "Eavesdrop" means to overhear, record, amplify, or transmit any part of a 
wire or oral communication of others without the consent of at least one party thereto by 
means of any electronic, mechanical, or other device. 
76-9-402. Privacy Violation. 
(1) A person is guilty of privacy violation if, except as authorized by law, he: 
(a) Trespasses on property with intent to subject anyone to 
eavesdropping or other surveillance in a private place; or 
(b) Installs in any private place, without the consent of the person or 
persons entitled to privacy there, any device for observing, photographing, 
recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or events in the place or uses any 
such unauthorized installation; 
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-29(4) 
78-12-29. Within One Year. 
An action may be brought within one year: 
(4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction; 
Addendum 4 
Utah Administrative Code R156-37-11 (11), (14) (1994) 
Rl56-37-11 Restrictions Upon the Prescription, Dispensing and Administration of 
Controlled Substances 
(11) A practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or administer a Schedule II 
controlled stimulant for purposes of weight reduction or control. 
(14) A prescribing practitioner may prescribe, dispense or administer a 
Schedule III or IV controlled substance for purposes of weight reduction in the treatment 
of obesity only as an adjunct, in accordance with the F.D.A approved labeling for the 
product, in a medically supervised program of weight reduction based on caloric 
restriction, provided that all of the following conditions are met: 
(a) before initiating treatment utilizing a Schedule III or IV controlled 
substance, the prescribing practitioner determines through review 
of his own records of prior treatment, or through review of the 
records of prior treatment which another treating prescribing 
practitioner or weight-loss program has provided to the prescribing 
practitioner, that the patient has made a substantial good-faith 
effort to lose weight in a treatment program utilizing a regimen of 
weight reduction based on caloric restriction, nutritional 
counseling, behavior modification, and exercise, without the 
utilization of controlled substances, and that said treatment has 
been ineffective; 
(b) before initiating treatment utilizing a Schedule III or IV controlled 
substance, the prescribing practitioner obtains a thorough history, 
performs a thorough physical examination of the patient, and rules 
out the existence of any recognized contraindications to the use of 
the controlled substance to be utilized; 
(c) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or administer any 
Schedule III or IV controlled substance when he knows or has 
reason to believe that a recognized contraindication to its use 
exists; 
(d) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or administer 
Schedule III or IV controlled substances for weight reduction for a 
period longer than twelve weeks in any one-year period. The one 
year period shall begin counting the first day of the drug therapy as 
indicated on the prescriber instructions for use; 
(e) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or administer any 
Schedule III or IV controlled substance in the treatment of a 
patient who he knows or should know is pregnant; and 
(f) the practitioner shall not initiate or shall discontinue prescribing, 
dispensing or administering all Schedule III or IV controlled 
substances for weight reduction immediately upon ascertaining or 
having reason to believe: 
(i) that the patient has failed to lose weight while under 
treatment with a controlled substance or controlled 
substances over a period of 28 days, which determination 
shall be made by a scheduled weighing of the patient at 
least every fourteenth day, except that a patient who has 
never before received treatment for obesity utilizing any 
controlled substance who fails to lose weight during his 
first such treatment attempt may be treated with a different 
controlled substance for an additional fourteen days; 
(ii) that the patient has developed tolerance (decreasing 
contribution of the drug toward further weight loss) to the 
anorectic effects of the controlled substance being utilized; 
(iii) that the patient has a history of drug abuse or shows a 
propensity for alcohol abuse; or 
(iv) that the patient has consumed or disposed of any controlled 
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of Utah County, State of Utah 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM / ^ / . ^ ^ 5 ^ 3 C p i l t ) ) 
The verdict in this case will be determined by your answers to a series of questions ^ 
set forth below. Make sure that you read the questions and notes carefully. 
NOVEMBER 6,1996 BROADCAST 
1. Did Mary Sawyers defame or place Dr. Michael Jensen in a false light in the 
November 6, 1996 broadcast? 
^ 
Yes A No 
2. Did United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX defame or place Dr. Michael Jensen in 
a false light in the November 6, 1996 broadcast? 
x Yes A No 
If you answered "Yes" to questions 1 or 2, please proceed to the next question. If 
you answered "No" to both questions, please proceed to page 3. 
3. Did Dr. Jensen sustain any damages as a result of the defamation or false light 
in the November 6, 1996 broadcast? 
x Yes A No 
If you answered "Yes" to this question, please state the amount of damages 
sustained. If you answered "No" to this question, please proceed to page 3. 
Pecuniary Loss: $ /, lOQA, CYY) * 00 
General Damages: $ fl 00,0(^0 , DO 
4. Assuming that all the fault that caused Dr. Michael Jensen's damages totals 








United Television, Inc. 
IHC Inc. 






f. IHC Health Plans, Inc. 
g. Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing ("DOPL") 
h. David Robinson 
i. J. Craig Jackson 
j . Paul Allred 
k. Max D. Wheeler 
Total 100% 
5. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 














X Yes A No 
6. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Defamation and False Light claims from the November 6, 1996 broadcasts against 
United Television? 
Yes / \ No 
2 
SEPTEMBER 5,1995 & JUNE 17,1996 BROADCASTS 
1. Did Mary Sawyers place Dr. Michael Jensen in a false light in either or both of 
the September 5, 1995 or June 17, 1996 broadcasts? 
* 
Yes A No 
2. Did United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX place Dr. Michael Jensen in a false 
light in either or both of the September 5, 1995 or June 17, 1996 broadcasts? 
x Yes A No 
If you answered aYes" to questions 1 or 2, please proceed to the next question. If 
you answered "No" to both questions, please proceed to page 5. 
3. Did Dr. Jensen sustain any damages as a result of the false light in either or 
both of the September 5, 1995 or June 17, 1996 broadcasts? 
Yes A No 
If you answered "Yes" to this question, please state the amount of damages 
sustained. If you answered "No" to this question, please proceed to page 5. 
Pecuniary Loss: $ Qp £Y*). OOO 
General Damages: $ \ DP QO& 
4. Assuming that all the fault that caused Dr. Michael Jensen's damages totals 









United Television, Inc. 
JHC Inc. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 








g. Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing ("DOPL") 
h. David Robinson 
i. J. Craig Jackson 
j . Paul Allred 
k. Max D. Wheeler 
Total 100% 
5. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Invasion of Privacy-False Light claim in either or both of the September 5, 1995, or June 











X Yes l\ No 
6. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Invasion of Privacy-False Light claim in either or both of the September 5, 1995, or June 
17, 1996 broadcasts, against United Television? 
£ Yes / \ No 
4 
INVASION OF PRIVACY-COMMON LAW INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION 
1. Did Mary Sawyers intrude upon Dr. Michael Jensen's seclusion? 
Yes X - - No 
2. Did United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX intrude upon Dr. Michael Jensen's 
seclusion? 
Yes A No 
If you answered "Yes" to questions 1 or 2, please proceed to the next question. If 
you answered "No" to both questions, please proceed to page 7. 
3. Did Dr. Jensen sustain any damages as a result of the intrusion upon seclusion? 
Yes f\ No 
If you answered "Yes" to this question, please state the amount of damages 
sustained. If you answered "No" to this question, please proceed to page 7. 
Pecuniary Loss: $_ 
General Damages: $ , 5 ~ ( 0 ^ / O Q { 0 * DC~) 
4. Assuming that all the fault that caused Dr. Michael Jensen's damages totals 









United Television, Inc. 
mc inc. 
Intermountam Health Care, Inc. 







g. Division of Occupational and T>^ 
Professional Licensing ("DOPL") O % 
5 
h. David Robinson 
i. J. Craig Jackson 
j . Paul Allred 
k. Max D. Wheeler 
Total 100% 
5 Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 










£ Yes A No 
6 Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Invasion of Privacy-Common Law Intrusion Upon Seclusion claim against United 
Television? 
Yes A No 
6 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-9-402(l)(a)-PRrVACY VIOLATION 
1. Did Mary Sawyers violate Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402(1 )(a)? 
Yes No / \ 
2. Did United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX violate Utah Code Ann. §76-9-
402(l)(a)? 
Yes A No 
If you answered "Yes" to questions 1 or 2, please proceed to the next question. If 
you answered "No" to both questions, please proceed to the page 9. 
3. Did Dr. Jensen sustain any damages as a result of the violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-9-402(l)(a)? 
Yes / \ No 
If you answered "Yes" to this question, please state the amount of damages 
sustained. If you answered "No" to this question, please proceed to page 9. 
Pecuniary Loss: $_ £i 
General Damages: $. 
4. Assuming that all the fault that caused Dr. Michael Jensen's damages totals 










United Television, Inc. 
LHC Inc. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 
IHC Health Plans, Inc. 
Division of Occupational and 















h. David Robinson Q % 
i. J. Craig Jackson O % 
j . Paul Allred P ) % 
k. Max D. Wheeler O % 
Total 100% 
5. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402(1 )(a)-Privacy Violation claim against Mary Sawyers? 
Yes A No 
6. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402(l)(a)-Privacy Violation claim against United Television? 
Yes / \ No 
8 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-9-402(l)(b>-PRrVACY VIOLATION 
1. Did Mary Sawyers violate Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402(l)(b)? 
Yes 1 No 
402(l)(b)? 
2. Did United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX violate Utah Code Ann. §76-9-
Yes A No 
If you answered "Yes" to questions 1 or 2, please proceed to the next question. If 
you answered "No" to both questions, please proceed to page 11. 
3. Did Dr. Jensen sustain any damages as a result of the violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-9-402(l)(b)? 
Yes A No 
If you answered "Yes" to this question, please state the amount of damages 
sustained. If you answered "No" to this question, please proceed to page 11. 
Pecuniary Loss: $_ a 
General Damages: $ ^f)} ffiV) - DO 
4. Assuming that all the fault that caused Dr. Michael Jensen's damages totals 









United Television, Inc. 
IHC Inc. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 








g. Division of Occupational and 






J. Craig Jackson 
Paul Allred 












5. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402(1 )(b)-Privacy Violation claim against Mary Sawyers? 
X Yes A No 
6. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402(1 )(b)-Privacy Violation claim against United Television? 
Yes A No 
10 
402(l)(c)? 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-9-402(l)(c)-PRrVACY VIOLATION 
1. Did Mary Sawyers violate Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402(l)(c)? 
Yes X No 
2. Did United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX violate Utah Code Ann. §76-9-
Yes A No 
If you answered "Yes" to questions 1 or 2, please proceed to the next question. If 
you answered "No" to both questions, please proceed to page 13. 
3. Did Dr. Jensen sustain any damages as a result of the violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-9-402(l)(c)? 
Yes No 1 
If you answered "Yes" to this question, please state the amount of damages 
sustained. If you answered "No" to this question, please proceed to page 13. 
Pecuniary Loss: $ 
General Damages: $ 
4. Assuming that all the fault that caused Dr. Michael Jensen's damages totals 
100%, please indicate the percentage of that fault attributable to each of the following: 
a. Michael Jensen % 
b. Mary Sawyers % 
c. United Television, Inc. % 
d. IHC Inc. % 
e. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. % 
f. IHC Health Plans, Inc. % 
g. Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing ("DOPL") % 
11 
h. David Robinson % 
i. J. Craig Jackson % 
j . Paul Allred % 
k. Max D. Wheeler % 
Total 100% 
5. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402(1 )(c)-Privacy Violation claim against Mary Sawyers? 
Yes No 
6. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Utah Code Ann §76-9-402(l)(c)-Privacy Violation claim against United Television? 
Yes No 
12 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-9-403-COMMUNICATION ABUSE 
1. Did Mary Sawyers violate Utah Code Ann. §76-9-403? 
Yes X No 
2. Did United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX violate Utah Code Ann. §76-9-403? 
Yes / \ No 
If you answered "Yes" to questions 1 or 2, please proceed to the next question. If 
you answered "No" to both questions, please proceed to page 15. 
3. Did Dr. Jensen sustain any damages as a result of the violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-9-403? 
Yes No 1 
If you answered uYes" to this question, please state the amount of damages 
sustained. If you answered "No" to this question, please proceed to page 15. 
Pecuniary Loss: $ 
General Damages: $ 
4. Assuming that all the fault that caused Dr. Michael Jensen's damages totals 
100%, please indicate the percentage of that fault attributable to each of the following: 
a. Michael Jensen % 
b. Mary Sawyers % 
c. United Television, Inc. % 
d. IHC Inc. % 
e. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. % 
f. IHC Health Plans, Inc. % 
g. Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing ("DOPL") % 
h. David Robinson % 
13 
i. J. Craig Jackson % 
j . Paul Allred % 
k. Max D. Wheeler % 
Total 100% 
5. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Utah Code Ann §76-9-403-Communication Abuse claim against Mary Sawyers? 
Yes No 
6 Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's Utah Code Ann §76-9-403-Communication Abuse claim against United Television? 
Yes No 
14 
18 U.S.C. §2511-INTERCEPTION AND DISCLOSURE OF WIRE, ORAL, OR 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
1. Did Mary Sawyers violate 18 U.S.C. §2511? 
Yes No X 
2. Did United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX violate 18 U.S.C. §2511? 
Yes N o _ 
If you answered "Yes" to questions 1 or 2, please proceed to the next question. If 
you answered "No" to both questions, please proceed to page 17. 
3. Did Dr. Jensen sustain any damages as a result of the violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§2511? 
Yes No 
If you answered "Yes" to this question, please state the amount of damages 
sustained. If you answered "No" to this question, please proceed to page 17. 
Pecuniary Loss: $ 
General Damages: $ 
4. Assuming that all the fault that caused Dr. Michael Jensen's damages totals 
100%, please indicate the percentage of that fault attributable to each of the following: 
a. Michael Jensen % 
b. Mary Sawyers % 
c. United Television, Inc. % 
d. IHC Inc. % 
e. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. % 
f. IHC Health Plans, Inc. % 
g Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing ("DOPL") % 
15 
h. David Robinson % 
i. J. Craig Jackson % 
j . Paul Allred % 
k. Max D. Wheeler % 
Total 100% 
5. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's 18 U.S.C. §2511 claim against Mary Sawyers. 
Yes No 
6. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's 18 U.S.C. §2511 claim against United Television. 
Yes No 
16 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
1. Did Mary Sawyers intentionally interfere with Dr. Michael Jensen's prospective 
economic relations? 
Yes J\ No -hr 
2. Did United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX intentionally interfere with Dr. 
Michael Jensen's prospective economic relations? 
Yes / \ No -ft-
If you answered "Yes" to questions 1 or 2, please proceed to the next question. If 
you answered "No" to both questions, you have completed the special verdict form. 
3. If so, did the intentional interference with prospective economic relations occur 
in: (please check any or all that apply) 
a. September 5, 1995 Broadcast 
b. June 17, 1996 Broadcast _/\ 
c. November 6, 1996 Broadcast A 
d. Other conduct 
4. Did Dr. Jensen sustain any damages as a result of the intentional interference 
with his prospective economic relations? 
A Yes / \ No 
If you answered "Yes" to this question, please state the amount of damages 
sustained. If you answered "No" to this question, you have completed the special verdict form. 
jQ Pecuniary Loss: $_ 
General Damages: $. 
5. Assuming that all the fault that caused Dr. Michael Jensen's damages totals 
100%, please indicate the percentage of that fault attributable to each of the following: 
a. Michael Jensen Ly % 
17 
b. Mary Sawyers 
C. United Television, Inc. 
d. IHC Inc. 
e. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 
f IHC Health Plans, Inc. 
g. Division of Occupational and 






J. Craig Jackson 
Paul Allred 






















6. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's intentional interference with prospective economic relations claim against Mary 
Sawyers? 
Yes A No 
7. Do you find that the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate in Dr. 
Jensen's intentional interference with prospective economic relations claim against United 
Television? 
Yes /A No 
DATED this 
— . , _ ^ . 
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In the following causes of action, you as the jury, determined that the assessment 
of punitive damages is appropriate. The amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen will 
be determined by your answers to the following questions. Please make sure that you read the 
questions carefully. 
NOVEMBER 6,1996 BROADCAST 
1. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
Mary Sawyers as a result of the false light and defamation found in the November 6, 1996 
broadcast. 
«//)/Y)-nn 
2. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
United Television, Inc. a.k a. KTVX as a result of the false light and defamation found in the 
November 6, 1996 broadcast. 
%Li5~D1mo>oD 
SEPTEMBER 5,1995 & JUNE 17,1996 BROADCASTS 
1. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
Mary Sawyers as a result of the false light found in the September 5, 1995 and June 17, 1996 
broadcasts. 
ttno.m 
2. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX as a result of the false light found in the September 5, 1995 
and June 17, 1996 broadcasts. 
s^.yrryy/y) 
.Deputy 
INVASION OF PRIVACY-COMMON LAW INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION 
1. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
Mary Sawyers as a result of her intrusion upon Dr. Jensen's seclusion. 
2. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX as a result of its intrusion upon Dr. Jensen's seclusion. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-9-402(l)(a)-PRrVACY VIOLATION 
1. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX as a result of its privacy violation under Utah Code Ann. 
§76-9-402(l)(a). 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-9-402(l)(b)-PRrVACY VIOLATION 
1. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
Mary Sawyers as a result of her privacy violation under Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402(l)(a). 
s - £ > -
2. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX as a result of its privacy violation under Utah Code Ann. 
§76-9-402(l)(b). 
2 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
1. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
Mary Sawyers as a result of her intentional interference with his prospective economic relations. 
$ -o 
2. Please state the amount of punitive damages awarded to Dr. Jensen against 
United Television, Inc. a.k.a. KTVX as a result of its intentional interference with his prospective 
economic relations. 
s^rmo •on 




WESLEY F. SINE 2967 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IBM Building Suite 355 
420 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801 364-5125 
Fax: 801 521 0732 
Dale F Gardiner, Esq. 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801 521 3434 
Fax: 801 521 3484 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL JENSEN, M.D., 
Plaintiff, ORDER 
vs. 
Case No. 97-00400512CV 
MARY SAWYERS and UNITED Judge Ray Harding, Jr. 
TELEVISION, INC., AKA. KTVX, 
Defendants. 
The following motions came before the Court for oral argument on September 18 2001: 
(1) Defendants' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT and 2) Defendants' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT. 
Defendants were represented by Robert M. Anderson, Esq. and Jennifer K. Anderson, 
Esq , and Plaintiff was represented by Wesley F Sine and Dale F. Gardiner, Esq , The parties fully 
briefed the issues and the Court being fully apprised therein. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court having issued its Ruling on the motion on September 26, 
2001 and for the reasons and findings contained therein, it is hereby ordered: U * *• • ~ 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
oi Utah Countv, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH Clerk 
1. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS DENIED. 
2. DEFENDANT MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JURY VERDICT IS 
DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART The judgment entered on or about March 13, 
2001 contains actual damage awards of $50,000 and punitive damage awards of $40,000.00 on 
each of the following claims: Common Law Intrusion upon Seclusion; Violation of U.C.A. 76-9-
402(1 )(a); and Violation of U C.A 76-9-402(1 )(b). Those claims are based on the same facts and 
seek the same relief, and the damage awards on those claims are thus duplicative. The court 
vacates $100,000 00 of the total actual damage award and $80,000 00 of the punitive damage 
award as duplicative 
3. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT IS DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED EN PART. Judgment is granted in favor of 
Defendants on Plaintiffs claims under Utah Code Ann. Section 76-9-402(1 )(c) and 76-9-403. The 
ultimate damage award is unaffected. All other parts of Defendants' motion for j.n.o.v. are denied. 
4. THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON MARCH 13, 2001 IS NOW A FINAL 
JUDGMENT. The post judgment interest as set forth in the Judgment entered March 13, 2001 
shall be corrected to 7.34% interest for the duration of the judgment.. 
Robert M. Anderson^jj^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the^+^day of October, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing order to be hand-delivered to the following 
Robert M Anderson 
Jennifer K Anderson 
Bradley M Strassberg 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL, & McCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake7 City, Utah 8414 -^034C 
<U ir 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
r l f e r ^oem 
MICHAEL JENSEN, M.D., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARY SAWYERS and UNITED 
TELEVISION, INC., a.k.a. KTVX, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 970400512 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Defendants' Motion for New Trial and to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the parties' memoranda, heard oral 
arguments, and being fully advised in the premises issues the following: 
RULING 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs Motions to Amend Judgment and 
Motions for New Trial. Defendants rely on three of the grounds listed in the rule as a basis for 
their motion: 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
Rule 59(a). Rule 59(e) provides that "[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." 
In Bowden v. TheDenver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., the Utah Supreme Court 
stated, 
1 (^ % 
We reaffirm our commitment that "'The right of jury trial... is . . . a right so 
fundamental and sacred to the citizen... [that it] should be jealously guarded by 
the courts.'" But once having been granted such right and a verdict rendered, it 
should not be regarded lightly nor overturned without good and sufficient reason; 
nor should a judgment be disturbed merely because of error. Only when there is 
error both substantial and prejudicial, and when there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the result would have been different without it, should error be regarded as 
sufficient to upset a judgment or grant a new trial. 
286 P.2d 240, 244 (Utah 1955). 
Excessive Damages 
In order to receive a new trial on the grounds of excessive damages, the Defendants must 
meet the standard set forth in Paul v. Kirkendall, 123 Utah 627, 629; 261 P.2d 670, 671 (Utah 
1953): 
Rule 59(a) (5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a new trial may be 
granted on grounds of excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. It is not enough, under this rule 
nor under the code provision which it supplanted, merely to allege that the amount 
itself is excessive. The amount of the verdict is ordinarily a matter exclusively for 
the jury and on the ground of adequacy of the verdict alone, the court may not 
interfere with the jury's verdict unless it clearly appears that the award was 
rendered under misunderstanding or prejudice. If inadequacy or excessiveness of 
the verdict presents a situation that such inadequacy or excessiveness shows a 
disregard by the jury of the evidence or the instructions of the court as to the law 
applicable to the case as to satisfy the court that the verdict was rendered under 
such disregard or misapprehension of the evidence or influence of passion or 
prejudice, then the court may exercise its discretion in the interest of justice and 
grant a new trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has said, 
The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But the mere fact that it was more than 
another jury, or more than this court, might have given, or even more than the 
evidence justified, does not conclusively show that it was the result of passion, 
prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury. 
Duffy v. Union Pacific Railroad. 118 Utah 82, 89 (Utah 1950). 
Defendants cannot show that the jury disregarded the testimony of Plaintiff s economic 
experts. "To justify a new trial for excessive damages under Rule 59(a)(5), Utah R. Civ. P., the 
damage award must be more than generous; it must be clearly excessive on any rational view of 
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the evidence." Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co.. 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 
1985). 
The fact that much of the jury's award is for "soft" damages does not mean that such 
damages are not recoverable, although it may reflect on how high an award of punitive damages 
may be without being excessive. See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 811-
812 (Utah 1991). 
The Court finds no evidence of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury as to actual 
damages. The Court now examines punitive damages. 
Any motion for a new trial on the question of punitive damages requires that the 
trial court engage in a two-part inquiry: (i) whether punitives are appropriate at 
all, i.e., whether the evidence is sufficient to support a lawful jury finding of 
defendant's requisite mental state, and (ii) whether the amount of punitives is 
excessive or inadequate, appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
Crookston. 817 P.2d at 807. 
The jury was presented sufficient evidence of wilfulness and excessive publication that a 
reasonable jury could find punitive damages warranted. Crookston sets forth seven factors to 
consider when determining the reasonableness of a punitive damage award. 
The stated list of factors we have said must be considered in assessing the 
amount of punitives to be awarded include the following seven: (i) the relative 
wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and 
circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the 
plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) 
the relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual damages awarded. 
Id at 808. 
Crookston also has given the Utah courts a guidepost to follow in interpreting what appears to be 
"given under the influence of passion or prejudice." 
The general rule to be drawn from our past cases appears to be that where the 
punitives are well below $ 100,000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio 
to actual damages have seldom been upheld and that where the award is in excess 
of $ 100,000, we have indicated some inclination to overturn awards having ratios 
oflessthan3 to 1. 
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In these patterns, we find that guidelines emerge for trial courts faced with 
challenges to punitive damage awards on the grounds of excessiveness under rule 
59(a)(5). If the ratio of punitive to actual damages falls within the range that this 
court has consistently upheld, then the trial court may assume that the award is not 
excessive. In denying a rule 59(a)(5) motion for a new trial, the trial court need not 
give any detailed explanation for its decision if the punitive damage award falls 
within this ratio range. If the award exceeds the ratios set by our past pattern of 
decision, the trial court is not bound to reduce it. However, if such an award is 
upheld, the trial judge must make a detailed and reasoned articulation of the 
grounds for concluding that the award is not excessive in light of the law and the 
facts. 
M a t 810-11. 
The punitive damages in this case greatly exceed $100,000. Therefore, the presumption 
against excessiveness of an award of punitive damages less than three times the amount of actual 
damages does not apply. For the larger punitive damage awards, Crookston cites cases upholding 
a 1 to 1 and a V* to 1 ratio. See id at 810, citing Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 772 (Utah 
1985) and Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co.. 701 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Utah 1985). The ratio 
in this case is closer to 1/3 punitive to 1 actual damages ($840,900 punitive damages to 
$2,375,000 actual damages). This ratio appears to be smaller than others listed as acceptable in 
Crookston. However, as the punitive damage award is considerably larger than $100,000, this 
Court will provide some guidance as to why the award appears appropriate. The relative wealth 
of a least one of the Defendants, United Television, is very large. The jury found and there was 
evidence to support a finding that the impact on the Plaintiffs life and lifestyle were great. The 
fact that Defendant's made three separate broadcasts over the course of more than a year based 
on the same hidden camera interview suggests a probability of future recurrence. The amount of 
actual damages is very high and could warrant an even higher punitive damage award; however, 
the jury appears to have considered that some of the actual damages were soft and awarded a 
comparatively small ratio of punitive damages. This Court does not find the damages, actual or 
punitive, to be so excessive as to be the result of passion or prejudice. 
•J'.TI 
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Insufficient Evidence 
On the subject of insufficient evidence, the Utah Supreme Court has said, 
Even though a trial judge may disagree with a verdict, mere disagreement 
is not sufficient reason to order a new trial. The power of a trial judge to order a 
new trial is to be used in those rare cases when a jury verdict is manifestly against 
the weight of the evidence. Because there is inherent tension between the right of a 
litigant to have a jury decide a case and the right of a trial judge to order a new 
trial in the interests of justice and because of the added expense and inconvenience 
of a new trial, the granting of "a new trial on an evidentiary basis under Rule 
59(a)(6) should be exercised with forebearance." 
Goodard v. Hickman 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984). 
Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to prove that the allegedly tortious actions of 
Defendants caused Plaintiff economic harm. As a corollary to that assertion, Defendants contend 
that most of the damage to Plaintiff stemmed from non-actionable true statements made by the 
Defendants. As the jury did not state which statements it found that put Plaintiff in a false light, 
Defendants assert that it appears from the size of the jury award that the jury made an 
impermissible award of damages based on true or privileged statements. 
The Court disagrees. The jury instructions clearly set forth what types of statements are 
actionable and requires that the jury find proximate cause. Instruction 21 states, 
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, produces the injury and without which the injury would not 
have occurred. A proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury. 
Instruction 56, which sets forth the standard for evaluating defamation claims, states in part, 
"[i]n considering damages, if any, you should consider those pecuniary losses and general 
damages which the plaintiff has shown by the preponderance of the evidence to have sustained 
that were proximately caused by the publication of the false statements." (emphasis added). The 
Court will not indulge in mere speculation that the jury disregarded the instructions. Evidence 
existed that Plaintiff was fired from IHC's WorkMed after the second broadcast and his hours at 
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the Art City Medical Clinic were cut because of the third broadcast. Plaintiff showed damages 
arising from each broadcast and actionable statements within each broadcast. Defendants do not 
show additional bad conduct by the Plaintiff after the first broadcast. The Court rejects 
Defendants' contention that none of the statements they recite are capable of defaming or placing 
the Plaintiff in a false light when examined by a reasonable person. 
Defendants argue that because the jury declined to find liability for intentional interference 
on the September 5, 1995 broadcast, they likely found the statements in that broadcast true or 
non-actionable and the false light award based on that broadcast are patently inconsistent. 
Plaintiffs argue that the failure to award intentional interference damages for the first broadcast 
merely shows that the jury did not find intent to interfere until repeated broadcasts, but that does 
not undercut a finding of libel. "Where the possibility of inconsistency injury interrogatories or 
special verdicts exists, the courts will not presume inconsistency; rather, they will seek to 
reconcile the answers if possible." Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 
1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). 
Plaintiff also points out that Defendants made no objection based on the alleged ambiguity 
in the verdict form. 
Furthermore, Johnson Construction failed to object to the verdict before 
the jury was discharged. When special interrogatories or verdicts are ambiguous, 
counsel has an obligation either to object to the filing of the verdict or to move 
that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for clarification. If a party fails to take 
appropriate action before the discharge of the verdict, that party generally may not 
later move for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was defective. 
Id. 
The Court holds that the jury instructions were adequate and the jury was properly 
instructed on proximate cause, false light, and defamation and the jury did not need to specify 
which statements they found actionable. 
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Errors in Law 
Statute of Limitations 
The issue of the applicable statute of limitations for false light claims was resolved by the 
Court at the summary judgment stage. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29 does not specifically apply to 
false light claims. Defendants rely on footnote 37 of Russell v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 842 
P.2d 896, 906 (Utah 1992). Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 106 Wash.2d 466, 722 P.2d 
1295, 1299 (Wash. 1986) appears in the string cites in the footnote as an example of cases that 
have applied heightened standards of defamation to related claims. The issue addressed by the 
Russell Court was not the statute of limitations. Where the statute of limitations is not specified 
the default provisions apply. This Court holds that false light claims fall within the four years 
specified by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. 
Public Concern Privilege 
The Court has previously rejected Defendants' argument that there exists a public concern 
privilege in Utah independent of the privilege of Fair Comment on a Matter of Public Concern. 
Seegmiller clearly states the standard for private figure plaintiffs on matters of public concern. 
We are persuaded that the necessary degree of fault which must be shown 
in a defamation action brought by a "private individual" against the media is 
negligence. The need to provide the media with a margin for error is most clear 
and compelling in cases involving public officials and public figures. The 
requirement of actual malice in the constitutional sense provides that margin for 
error which permits the freest flow of information likely to be of importance in 
deciding matters of public import, without extinguishing all protection for 
reputational interests. But an appropriate reduction of the motivation for 
self-censorship, and the promotion of full-blown discussion of public issues does 
not require the same "breathing space" when a private individual is the plaintiff, 
especially when the latitude which the media enjoys may be expanded in matters of 
public concern by a qualified privilege. 
Seegmiller at 973. 
Cox v. Hatch made clear that Seegmiller was analyzed as a statement of a matter of public 
interest. 
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In Seegmiller, we had no occasion to discuss the public interest issue 
because the trial court had held that the defamatory statement concerned a matter 
of public interest and that ruling was not challenged on appeal. 
We did, however, refer to the "public issue" qualified privilege, which 
provided the basis for the decision in Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222 
(Utah 1976), and Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 
P.2d 1 (1933). In both of these cases, the basic privilege was not directly rooted in 
the First Amendment, but was founded on a similar common law policy. 
Cox at 559, n.3. The confusion arises because Seegmiller also discusses a "public issue" privilege 
based on Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976), which the Court found 
inapplicable to the Seegmiller facts. 
The conditional public concern privilege of Ogden Bus Lines is rather narrow. Ogden Bus 
Lines treats comments made in a KSL editorial. 
There is no evidence in the record showing or tending to show that any 
statements of fact made by defendant in the editorial concerning any plaintiff were 
false. On the contrary, the facts therein stated are shown by the evidence to be 
true, and therefore are not actionable. 
A respectable legal authority states the following rule: 
It is firmly established that matters of public interest and concern 
are legitimate subjects of fair comment and criticism, not only in 
newspapers, and in radio and television broadcasts, but by members of the 
public generally, and such comments and criticisms are not actionable, 
however severe in their terms, unless they are made maliciously . . . . 
It seems clear to this court that problems affecting our schools are matters 
in which the public has a legitimate interest and would be within the rule set forth 
above. This court has adopted this rule. 
Ogden Bus Lines v. KSLJnc, 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added). The Court 
continues saying, 
In the Williams case, this court held the defendant newspaper was 
performing a duty "of a moral or social character of imperfect obligation." Further, 
this court quoted approvingly from a leading authority as follows: 
. . . . A fair and bona fide comment on a matter of public interest is an 
excuse of what would otherwise be a defamatory publication.... 
The court also quoted the following from another leading authority as follows: 
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. . . . The right of comment is not restricted to a restatement of the naked 
facts. As a general rule it may include the right to draw inferences or 
express opinions from facts established. The soundness of the inferences or 
opinions is immaterial whether they are right or wrong, provided they are 
made in good faith and based upon the truth. . . . 
Id at 224-25. 
It is apparent that Ogden Bus Lines was decided on a common law privilege raising the 
degree of fault that must be proved for a fair comment on a matter of public concern. To the 
extent that the New York and Colorado cases extend beyond opinion and commentary, they are 
dicta. Interestingly, the New York case was reversed by Commercial Programming Unlimited v. 
Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 378N.Y.S.2d 69 (N.Y. App. 1975). The Colorado case 
was overruled in part by DiversifiedManagement v. Denver Post, 653 p.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982) on 
other grounds. Read in context, the New York and Colorado cases are merely cited to 
demonstrated the malice standard applicable to a conditional privilege, not to establish the scope 
of that privilege. 
Russell v. Thompson, 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992), also discussed the common law public 
concern privilege as being one of "fair comment": 
Fair comment is a common law defense to an action for defamation. The fair 
comment defense privileges a statement when it involves a matter of public 
concern, and is based on true or privileged facts, and represents the actual opinion 
of the speaker, but is not made for the sole purpose of causing harm. According to 
the majority rule, the privilege applies only to an expression of opinion, not to a 
false statement of fact, whether it is expressly stated or implied from an expression 
of opinion. 
Id. at 902. The Court also stated that "[t]he fair comment privilege does not protect assertions of 
fact like the statement at issue here." Id at 903. 
Utah has not adopted a broader privilege and is unlikely to do so. A broad privilege 
requiring constitutional malice any time the matter is one of public concern would undo the 
Seegmiller negligence standard, which, incidentally, involved a media defendant. 
•.-•::.r. 
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Dr. Jensen is clearly a private figure plaintiff. His prescribing practices and diet 
medications are matters of public concern. See Russell v. Thompson. 842 P.2d 896, 902 (Utah 
1992) ("Allegations of misconduct against a local doctor and nurse are certainly matters of public 
concern"). See also Seegmiller, 626 P.2d at 978 (suggesting that public health and safety issues 
strengthen an argument that a matter is of public concern). 
Since Plaintiff is a private figure and the matter is one of public concern, the correct 
standard of fault is negligence under Seegmiller, Following Russell, a qualified privilege exists for 
Defendants' comments on matters of public concern. 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
Duplicative Damages 
Defendants object to allegedly duplicative awards. Utah case law is somewhat sparse on 
the subject. Defendants cite Steenblickv. Lichfield,906 P.2d 872, 881 (Utah 1995), for the 
proposition that causes of action "based on the same set of facts," are duplicative and all but one 
should be vacated. While Steenblick dealt with an award of punitive as well as treble damages, it 
also pointed out that a statutory award and common law award both based on same facts should 
be considered duplicative. See id The two sets of damages obviously fulfilled the same punitive 
purpose and one was vacated. 
In Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 153 (Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals 
considered duplicative damages as to actual rather than punitive damages. In Brown, the trial 
court ruled that the damages on the fraud claim and the damages on the breach of warranty claim 
were duplicative: 
A jury is allowed wide discretion in awarding damages. Bennion v. 
LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). Courts must 
defer to the jury's determination of damages unless (1) the jury disregarded 
competent evidence, (2) the award is so excessive beyond rational justification as 
to indicate the effect of improper factors in the determination, and (3) the award 
was rendered under a misunderstanding. Id. at 1084. No such errors appear in 
this case to justify the trial court in striking the jury's award. The trial court's ruling 
amounted to nothing more than mere speculation that the awards were duplicative. 
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We therefore reverse the trial court's ruling and reinstate the jury's award of 
$100,000 to Richards for Brown's breach of warranty. 
Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143, 153 (Utah App. 1992). In this case, the Court of Appeals even 
states in footnote seven, 
Arguably, Richards need not even prove that there was a nonduplicative basis for 
the jury's award because the proof required to prove fraud differs from that 
required to prove a breach of warranty. 
Id However, this footnote is in reference to part of the claim for breach of warranty that was 
nonduplicative in any case. 
Defendants' assertion that the defamation and false light claims are duplicative fails. 
For the same reason that an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is 
distinct from a defamation claim, invasion of privacy is also distinct. The invasion 
of privacy claim protects an individual's interest in being let alone. This interest is 
distinct from the interest in reputation. Further, an action for invasion of privacy 
may be the only available remedy when the statements complained of are not 
themselves false, but merely place the plaintiff in a false light. 
Russell v. Thompson Newspapers. Inc.. 842 P.2d 896, 906-7 (Utah 1992). Additionally, 
defamation and false light claims require proof of different facts. For instance, defamation 
requires proof of falsity and false light does not. Likewise, intentional interference with 
prospective business relations requires vastly different proof and protects Plaintiffs business 
interests rather than his privacy or reputational interests. The false light claim protects Plaintiffs 
privacy interests invaded by the broadcasts. Because the courts have determined that these claims 
protect different interests and require different facts, defamation and false light claims are 
nonduplicative. 
On the other hand, the statutory and common law privacy claims protect the Plaintiffs 
privacy interests invaded by the hidden camera surveillance and are based on the exact same facts. 
Therefore, the awards based on these facts are duplicative. 
Other jurisdictions give the following guidance: 
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It is well established that "double recovery is precluded when alternative 
theories seeking the same relief are pled and tried together. "If a federal claim and 
a state claim arise from the same operative facts, and seek identical relief, an award 
of damages under both theories will constitute double recovery." Where a jury 
award duplicates damages, the court, either sua sponte or on motion of a party, 
should reduce the judgment by the amount of the duplication. The question of 
whether damage awards are duplicative is one of fact, reviewable under the clearly 
erroneous standard. 
Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority. 115 F.3d 1442, 1459 (10th Cir. 1997), qff'dinpart, 
rev'dinpart, 124 F.3d 217 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). 
The plaintiff may be able to pursue several theories of recovery; if liability is found 
on each, the plaintiff would be required to make an election among awards if 
duplication or double recovery would otherwise result. 
Central Security and Alarm Co, Inc. v. Precision Security Alarm Corporation. 918 P.2d 1340, 
1346 (N.M. App. 1996). The standard appears to be that the allegedly duplicative claims must 
"arise from the same operative facts and seek identical relief' before a court will find the damages 
duplicative. The Brown case states that mere speculation is not enough to find duplication. 
This Court also notes that the statutory privacy claims arise under a criminal statute, 
which includes a provision for civil enforcement. While the three subparts of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-9-402 provide three diflferent means of finding a defendant has committed a privacy violation, 
a defendant may only be punished one way for the same act: 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable 
under only one such provision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1). 
It appears that while the legislature intended to show various ways in which the abuse 
could be accomplished, the abuse is the same in each circumstance. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-
402(1 )(a) appears to require intent and trespass to make an attempted but not fully realized 
privacy violation actionable. The criminal episode has progressed farther in 402(l)(b) and intent 
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is established by the installation itself and need not be proved separately. In each case, the 
criminal episode is the same and the interest to be protected is the victim's privacy. This is one 
violation actionable three ways. The Court will not award separate damages under each of the 
three ways that Plaintiff can show that the same privacy violation occurred. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs claims under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-402 arise under the 
same operative facts and seek identical relief. Plaintiff argues that a finding of trespass 
distinguishes § 76-9-402(l)(a) from the others. While that may be true, Plaintiffs recovery is 
based on privacy interests and not real property interests violated by trespass. In addition, a 
trespass was found only because of the "installation" of the camera. Likewise, the common law 
intrusion on seclusion claim arises under the same facts and seeks identical relief to the statutory 
awards. Therefore, the Court will vacate two of the three invasion of privacy claims (76-9-
402(l)(a), 76-9-402(l)(b), common law intrusion upon seclusion). 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
A trial court is justified in granting a motion for j.n.o.v. only when the court 
concludes that there is no competent evidence to support the verdict after 
examining the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Collins v. Wilson. 984 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1999). The Utah Supreme Court has also said, 
In deciding whether to grant a new trial, a trial court has some discretion, and we 
reverse only for abuse of that discretion. In passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v., 
however, a trial court has no latitude and must be correct. 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). 
Defendants claim that there is no competent evidence to support Plaintiffs common law 
invasion of privacy claim. The Court has already rejected Defendants' argument that a doctor's 
patient examination room cannot be a private place as a matter of law. The Court was persuaded 
by Plaintiffs analogy to a lawyer's office where attorney and client consult. The Court finds 
Desnickv. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d at 1352, and Medical Laboratory 
Management Consultants v. American Broadcasting Companies, 30 F. Supp. 1182, 
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distinguishable. Plaintiff cites Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971), for the 
proposition that a patient examination room is a private place. The office in Dietemann was 
attached to the home. Defendants seek to distinguish on that basis. The Court accepts the 
argument of Plaintiff and notes that the door was closed and Plaintiff knocked before entering. 
Defendants argue that no embarrassing details about the doctor were disclosed and seek to 
analogize the scenario in Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374 (Utah App. 
1997). In Stien, the intrusion was an obvious parody. This Court already made a threshold 
determination of offensiveness and will not second guess the jury's ultimate determination that the 
intrusion was highly offensive. 
Defendants' contend that any damage Plaintiff may have suffered from the intrusion was 
limited to publication damages. The Court disagrees. The eventual discovery by Plaintiff that his 
seclusion was intruded upon damages a sense of security and well-being. It subjects Plaintiff to a 
fear of future intrusions. 
Statutory Privacy Claims 
To recover under Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-402(1 )(a), a Plaintiff must show trespass and 
eavesdropping or other surveillance. Defendants assert that Mary Sawyers clearly did not 
eavesdrop. The Court agrees. "Eavesdrop" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-401(2). As 
Defendant Sawyers consented to the recording, eavesdropping does not apply. "Other 
surveillance," however, is still a viable means for Plaintiff to establish a violation. There was also 
sufficient evidence to find trespass. Evidence was presented in the form of the recorded 
solicitation by Defendant Sawyers for a consultation under false pretenses from which the jury 
could find a "trespass." See Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 256 A.D.2d 131 
(N.Y. App. 1998). 
The Court will likewise find competent evidence to support the jury verdict on section 
402(l)(b). The evidence was sufficient in the form of a video showing Defendant Sawyers 
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placing the camera in a set position to support a finding of installation needed for Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-9-402(l)(b). 
While the issue may be moot in the absence of monetary damages, Defendants are entitled 
to judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-402(1 )(c) and § 76-9-403 
claims. Plaintiff did not present evidence that the camera placed on the public reception desk 
could pick up sounds from within private consultation rooms. Likewise, Defendant Sawyers was 
a sender and/or receiver within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-403 and gave her consent. 
The jury awarded no damages on either of these claims, so the j.n.o.v. does not affect the ultimate 
damages award. 
[W]e recognized that where the proof of a compensable claim and otherwise non-
compensable claim are closely related and require proof of the same facts, a 
successful party is entitled to recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related 
facts. 
Kurth v. Wiarda. 991 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah App. 1999). 
The Court holds that the actual damages described in Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-406 are 
those damages that are not exemplary damages as described later in the section. The Court 
rejects Defendants' argument that actual damages are those that are not general damages. The 
Court finds no evidence of jury confusion by jury instruction 56 ("Pecuniary loss is loss that is 
actual, such as loss of income . . . . General damages are those that are the natural and necessary 
result of an act"). 
False Light and Defamation Claims 
Defendants' substantial truth, causation, statute of limitations, and privilege arguments 
have been discussed previously. As they are insufficient to warrant a new trial, the Court finds 
they are also insufficient to meet the higher j.n.o.v. standard. 
Intentional Interference Claim 
The Court finds there was competent evidence sufficient to uphold Plaintiffs claim for 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations. 
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Punitive Damages 
This Court has previously found there was competent evidence of malice sufficient to 
sustain the jury's award of punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion for New Trial is DENIED. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Amend the Jury Verdict is DENIED in part and GRANTED in 
part. There are three duplicative awards of $50,000 actual damages and $40,000 punitive 
damages each. The Court will vacate two of those. The Court vacates $100,000 of the total 
actual damage award and $80,000 of the total punitive damage award as duplicative. 
3. Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is DENIED in part and 
GRANTED in part. Judgment is granted in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs claims under Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-9-402(l)(c) and 76-9-403. The ultimate damage award is unaffected. 
4. Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling 
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for 
signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this v* V^day of September, 2001. 
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prepaid thereon this pffi; day of September, 2001, to the following: 
Robert Anderson / Jennifer Anderson, 50 South Main St. #1600, PO Box 45340, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84145-0340 
Wesley F. Sine, IBM Bldg #355, 420 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 











September 5, 1995 Broadcast 
Produced by Plaintiff (MHJ43 86) 
And a police officer is placed on paid leave after he shoots an alleged 
rapist. Those stories in just a moment. But, first an exclusive 
investigator's report. 
They've been called miracle diet pills. Pills so popular the manufacturer 
can't keep up with demands. 
But are doctors prescribing these pills too freely? Promising miracle 
weight loss but perhaps risking their patients' health? News 4 Utah 
investigator Mary Sawyers has been taking a look at these so-called 
miracle pills and a doctor who's prescribing them. 
Mary, what are these pills all about? 
Well, Brent, the most common names are Pondimin and Fastin. Those 
are the most common brand names. The amphetamine derivatives have 
long been FDA approved for weight loss. But a few years ago Dr. 
Michael Weintraub studied the two drugs in combination. He found 
that his subjects were losing an average of 16 percent of their body 
weight in 34 weeks. While the drugs do work for some people, 
they're not meant for everyone and doctors must follow specific guide-
lines when prescribing them. 
When Lynette Singleton got married five years ago she weighed 126 
pounds. After an accident forced her to cut down on exercise and a 
prescription hormone increased her appetite, she gained 70 pounds. In 
the last two months she's dropped 30 of those pounds by taking daily 
doses of two prescription diet pills. Pills she read about in Readers 
Digest. 
I approached my doctor with them and he prescribed them. Laughs. It 
was easy to get the pills. 
Perhaps it's too easy. We heard that Dr. Michael Jensen prescribed diet 
pills for some one at a dinner party who didn't need to lose weight. So I 
went to see him to see if he'd do the same for me. But I took along a 
hidden camera. 
Dr. Michael Jensen: I'm Dr. Jensen. 
Mary Sawyers: I'm Mary Sawyers. (Unintelligible background noises). 
DEFENDANT'S 




Mary Sawyers: Dr. Jensen gave me prescriptions for Fastin and Pondimin without 
weighing me or giving me a physical. During our visit he never 
asked if I have high blood pressure or diabetes, both conditions which 
could be aggravated by the drugs. 
Dr. Michael Jensen: Someone like you is a perfect candidate for this. Okay. Uh, people 
lose somewhere between 10 and 20 pounds a month and, you know, 
you can get really lean with this. 
Mary Sawyers: And if those drugs didn't work for me, the doctor said he'd prescribe 
something else. 
Dr. Michael Jensen: If Fastin didn't work for you, I would be willing to work with you uh 
maybe using Dexedrine. It's technically not legal for that reason. 
Mary Sawyers: In fact it is illegal to prescribe Dexedrine for weight loss. 
Mary Sawyers: So, what, you just put down attention deficit disorder? 
Dr. Michael Jensen: I usually, usually put narcolepsy in an adult. We all deal with fatigue 
and tiredness. 
Mary Sawyers: Uh hum. 
Dr. Michael Jensen: And you can just say I am tired. 
Mary Sawyers: I showed the tape to the man who heads the division which gave Dr. 
Jensen his license. 
David Robinson: When you look at the intent of that physician, uh it's clear that he knows 
that he is violating the law and is offering excuses for it and I think he is 
doing so uh with potential jeopardy to his patients. 
Mary Sawyers: There are strict guidelines all doctors must follow when prescribing drugs 
for weight loss. The first is that the drugs be used only for people who are 
obese. 
Dr. Michael Jensen: Selected individuals, uh, uh, treating them uh with a weight loss 
medication uh is warranted in my practice. Uh, I'm not speaking for 
other people, but uh in selected cases for people that are relatively thin. 
Mary Sawyers: Could there be some action taken against this doctor's license? 
David Robinson: We're very interested in looking at it. 
2 
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Mary Sawyers: Now, the State Division of Licensing and the Federal Drug Enforcement 
Agency both opened investigations into Dr. Jensen's prescribing practices. 
Brent Hunsaker: So, Mary, with those investigations and your story, what does the doctor 
have to say for himself now. 
Mary Sawyers: Well, Brent, he called tonight. He says he's sorry. He called and said he's 
learned a valuable lesson from all of this. He says he will have to change 
his prescribing practices, now. 
Kimberly Perkins: There might be a number of doctors thinking twice tonight. Thanks, 
Mary. 




DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South - Box 146741 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6741 
Telephone: (801) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF 
MICHAEL H. JENSEN, M.D. 
TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO 
ADMINISTER AND PRESCRIBE 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
P E T I T I O N 
CASE NO. DOPL-96-162 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
These claims were investigated by the DIVISION OF 
OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING ("Division") upon complaint 
that MICHAEL H. JENSEN, M.D. ("Respondent"), has engaged in acts 
and practices which constitute violations of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, UTAH CODE ANN., as 
amended, §§ 58-1-1 (1953), et seg. 
2ABXIE£ 
1. The Division is a Division of the Department of 
Commerce of the State of Utah and is established by virtue of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-1-2 (Supp. 1994) . 
2. Respondent is licensed by the Division under the 
Medical Practice Act to practice medicine and under the 
Controlled Substances Act to administer and prescribe controlled 
substances. He was so licensed at all times material to the 
allegations contained herein, 
STATEMENT OF ALIENATIONS 
3. a. On or about July 27, 1995, Respondent met in 
an office visit with Mary Sawyers. During that visit, Respondent 
gave Sawyers prescriptions for Fast in (Phentermine Hydrochloride) 
and Pondimin (Fenfluramine Hydrochloride) , each a Schedule IV 
controlled substance. Prior to providing these prescriptions, 
Respondent failed to perform a thorough physical examination or 
determine from Sawyers that she had made a substantial good-faith 
effort to lose weight in a treatment program utilizing a regimen 
of weight reduction based on caloric restriction, nutritional 
counseling, behavior modification, and exercise without the 
utilization of controlled substances, and failed to inquire of or 
otherwise determine from Sawyers the existence of conditions 
indicating possible contraindications to the controlled 
substances he had prescribed. 
b. During the visit, Respondent, described to 
Sawyers how she could accelerate and enhance the stimulant 
qualities of Fastin by opening the capsule and "biting11 the 
granules contained therein. 
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c. Respondent also told Sawyers that if Fastin 
did not produce the desired weight-loss results she sought, he 
would be willing to "work with" her "maybe using Dexedrine" 
(Dextroamphetamine) , a Schedule II controlled substance, though 
he acknowledged to Sawyers the use of Dexedrine for weight 
control is "technically not legal." Respondent told Sawyers he 
would use narcolepsy as the claimed reason for prescribing 
Dexedrine, since its use for that purpose is permitted. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
4. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-401(2) (a) (1994) provides in 
pertinent part that: 
The division may refuse to issue a license to an 
applicant and may refuse to renew or may revoke, 
suspend, restrict, place on probation, issue a public or 
private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license 
of any licensee in any of the following cases: 
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in 
unprofessional conduct as defined by statute under 
this title. 
5. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-501 (2) (1994) defines 
"unprofessional conduct" to include: 
(a) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person to 
violate, any statute, rule, or order regulating an 
occupation or profession under this title. 
(b) violating or aiding or abetting any other person to 
violate, any generally accepted professional or ethical 
standard applicable to an occupation or profession 
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regulated under this title. 
(g) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation 
or profession regulated under this title through gross 
incompetence, gross negligence, or a pattern of 
incompetency or negligence, 
6. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R156-37-9(7) (1994) provides in 
pertinent part that: 
[T]he Division may deny issuance of a license or may 
revoke, suspend, restrict or place on probation a 
controlled substance license if the applicant or 
licensee: 
(7) violates restrictions upon controlled 
substances, prescriptions and administration as 
contained in these rules: 
7. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R156-37-11 (14) (1994) provides in 
pertinent part that: 
(14) A prescribing practitioner may prescribe, dispense 
or administer a Schedule III or IV controlled substance 
for purposes of weight reduction in the treatment of 
obesity only as an adjunct, in accordance with the 
F.D.A. approved labeling for the product, in a medically 
supervised program of weight reduction based on caloric 
restriction, provided that all of the following 
conditions are met: 
(a) before initiating treatment utilizing a 
Schedule III or IV controlled substance, the 
prescribing practitioner determines through review 
of his own records of prior treatment, or through 
review of the records of prior treatment which 
another treating prescribing practitioner or 
weight-loss program has provided to the prescribing 
practitioner, that the patient has made a 
substantial good-faith effort to lose weight in a 
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treatment program utilizing a regimen of weight 
reduction based on caloric restriction, nutritional 
counseling, behavior modification, and exercise, 
without the utilization of controlled substances, 
and that said treatment has been ineffective; 
(b) before initiating treatment utilizing a 
Schedule III or IV controlled substance, the 
prescribing practitioner obtains a thorough 
history, performs a thorough physical examination 
of the patient, and rules out the existence of any 
recognized contraindications to the use of the 
controlled substance to be utilized; 
CQVNT I 
8. Paragraphs 1 through 7 are incorporated by reference 
as if fully stated herein. 
9. Because Respondent did not determine, through 
review of his own records of prior treatment, or through review 
of the records of prior treatment which another treating 
prescribing practitioner or weight-loss program had provided to 
the prescribing practitioner, that the patient had made a 
substantial good-faith effort to lose weight in a treatment 
program utilizing a regimen of weight reduction based on caloric 
restriction, nutritional counseling, behavior modification, and 
exercise, without the utilization of controlled substances, and 
that said treatment had been ineffective; did not obtain a 
thorough history, perform a thorough physical examination of the 
patient, and rule out the existence of any recognized 
5 
contraindications to the use of the controlled substance to be 
utilized, Respondent has violated Utah -Administrative Code R156-
37-11(14) (a)and(b), constituting "unprofessional conduct" as 
defined under Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2) (a), and grounds for 
sanctioning his licenses as provided under Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-
401(2)(a). 
COUNT II 
10. Paragraphs 1 through 7 are incorporated by 
reference as if fully set forth herein. 
11. Because Respondent advised a patient how to misuse 
a controlled substance and offered to prescribe a controlled 
substance for a condition that is contrary to the indicated use 
and suggested his willingness to make an unsubstantiated 
diagnosis to support that prescription, as described in paragraph 
3 above, Respondent has engaged in conduct constituting 
"unprofessional conduct" under Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2) (a) 
(b) and (g), constituting grounds for imposing a sanction against 
his licenses as provided under Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401(2) (a) . 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1. that Respondent be adjudged and decreed to have 
engaged in the acts alleged herein; 
2. that by engaging in the above acts, Respondent 
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be adjudged and decreed to have violated the heretofore 
enumerated provisions of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing Act and the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act; 
3. that an Order be issued imposing an appropriate 
sanction against the licenses of Respondent to practice medicine 
and to administer and prescribe controlled substances in 
accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-
401(2)(a), and Utah Admin. Code R156-37-9 (7). 
DATED this \2"~ day of JtJitc^  , 1996. 
Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing 
Department of Commerce 
APPROVED FOR FILING: 
R. Paul Allred 
Assistant Attorney General 
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STATE OF UTAH 
:SS, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the Vir day of JukiE ., 1996, personally 
appeared before me L. Del Mortensen, and after being duly sworn, 
deposes and says; that he has read the foregoing Petition and 
knows the contents thereof; and the same is true to the best of 
his knowledge except as to matters stated on information and 
belief, and that as to those matters he believes it to be true. 
~-i. id^i^y 
Investigator 
Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing 




160 E. 300 S. 
5.L.C., UT 84145 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
MARCH 30, 1998 
STATE OF UTAH 
(Seal) 
' ^ 2 L i_ 
NOTARY PUB 7V 
My Commission Expires 
3-30 - 9% 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the If day of June 1996, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION AND NOTICE OP AGENCY 
ACTION was sent first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
MICHAEL HENRIE JENSEN 
1900 NORTH OAK LANE 
PROVO UT 84604-2125 
Adele Bancroft 
Administrative ^ e'dtetary 
Addendum 9 
Transcript 
June 17, 1996 Broadcast 





Kimberly Perkins: The State is going after the license of a Utah County Doctor. 
Brent Hunsaker: Based on the News 4 Utah investigation, the state charges that Dr. 
Michael H. Jensen violated the professional code of conduct. His 
alleged offense, he misprescribed diet pills. 
Kimberly Perkins: News 4 Utah's medical reporter Mary Sawyers follows up. 
Dr. Michael Jensen: I'm Dr. Jensen. 
Mary Sawyers: 
Mary Sawyers: 
Dr. Michael Jensen: 
Mary Sawyers: 
Dr. Michael Jensen: 
Mary Sawyers: 
I'm Mary Sawyers. 
This is Dr. Michael Jensen. Last July he gave me prescriptions for 
Pondimin and Fastin a combination therapy often referred to as the 
Phen-Fen diet. 
Someone like you is a perfect candidate for this. Okay. Uh. People 
lose somewhere between 10 and 20 pounds a month and, you know, 
you can get really lean with this. 
But he gave me the drugs without following state law. The law says 
before prescribing drugs for weight loss a doctor must first determine 
that the patient has tried to lose weight in a treatment program. He must 
also give the patient a thorough physical exam. And he must rule out 
the existence of health conditions which might be aggravated by the drug. 
Dr. Jensen did none of these and so the state has filed a complaint against 
him alleging unprofessional conduct. The state says Jensen also broke the 
law a second time when he told me this. 
If Fastin didn't work for you, Fd be willing to work with you, uh, maybe 
using Dexedrine. It's technically not legal for that reason. 
In fact, it's illegal to prescribe Dexedrine for weight loss. Jensen says he 
hasn't seen the complaint and doesn't want to comment on the 
allegations. Last year he told me he never intended to break the law. 
Dr. Michael Jensen: Selected individuals, uh, uh, treating them uh with a weight loss 
medication, uh, is warranted in my practice. Uh, I'm not speaking for 
other people, uh, but in selected cases for people that are relatively thin. 
Mary Sawyers: If found guilty, Jensen's license could be suspended or revoked. Mary 
Sawyers News 4 Utah, 
Kimberly Perkins: Now, since our investigation, Intermountain Health Care has dropped 
Dr. Jensen from its panel of physicians but he is currently working for 
a family practice in Springville. 
Addendum 10 
R. PAUL ALLRED (No. 4785) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN C. GRAHAM (No. 1231) 
Attorney General 
Consumer Rights Division 
Box 14087 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
Telephone: (801) 366-0310 
Counsel for the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
MICHAEL H. JENSEN, M.D. 
TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO 
ADMINISTER AND PRESCRIBE 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 
Case No. DOPL-96-162 
Respondent Michael H. Jensen, M.D., ("Respondent") and the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("the 
Division"), by and through their counsel of record, hereby 
stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. Respondent is and has been a licensee of the Division 
at all times relevant to this action. 
2. Respondent admits to the jurisdiction of the Division 
over him and the subject matter of this action. 
3. Respondent acknowledges that he enters into this 
Stipulation and Order voluntarily, and that no promise or threat 
whatsoever has been made by the Division, or any member, officer, 
agent or representative of the Division, to induce him to enter 
into this Stipulation and Order. 
4. Respondent acknowledges that he has been informed of 
his right to be represented by counsel, and is represented by Max 
D. Wheeler. 
5. Respondent understands that he is entitled to a hearing 
before the Physicians Licensing Board (the "Board") at which time 
he may present to the Board evidence on his behalf, present his 
own witnesses and confront adverse witnesses. Respondent 
acknowledges that by executing this Stipulation and Order, he 
waives his right to: (1) a hearing before the Board on this 
matter; (2)present evidence on his behalf; (3)present his own 
witnesses; and(4)confront adverse witnesses, together with such 
other rights as to which he may be entitled in connection with 
said hearing. 
6. On or about June 12, 1996, the Division filed a 
petition alleging Respondent has engaged in the following 
conduct: 
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a. prescribing Schedule IV controlled substances for 
the purpose of weight reduction without complying with the 
requirements of R156-37-11(14) (a) and (b); and 
b. advising a patient how to misuse a controlled 
substance and offering to make an unsubstantiated diagnosis 
to support a prescription. 
See Petition, paragraph 3 copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A and is incorporated herein by reference. 
7. Respondent admits that he failed to comply with some of 
the requirements of R156-37-11 (14) (a) and (b) as set forth in 
paragraph 3 of the petition. Therefore, Respondent agrees that a 
public reprimand may be prepared and issued by the Board. In 
addition, the Respondent agrees to abide by the following terms 
and conditions: 
a. For a period of one year from the date of this 
Stipulation and Order, Respondent shall meet with the Board 
on a quarterly basis, beginning with the Board's first 
meeting from the date of this Stipulation and Order, or at 
such other greater or lesser frequency as determined by the 
Board; 
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b. Attend and successfully complete one of the 
following educational programs within (1) year from the date 
of this Stipulation and Order: 
(1) William Vilensky's course in "Controlled 
and Dangerous Substances'' cosponsored by the 
Forensic and Educational Consultants in 
Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Kennedy Memorial 
Hospital-University Medical Centers. 
(Vilensky's course is held semiannually in 
May and November of each year.) 
(2) The Oregon Board of Medical Examiners' 
"Appropriate Prescribing Workshop''. 
c. Respondent shall propose an ethics course for 
Board approval, which shall be completed within one year 
from the date of this Stipulation and Order. 
d. In the event Respondent leaves Utah to reside or 
practice in another state, Respondent shall notify the 
Board, in writing, his intention to do so, including the 
expected dates of departure and return. Such notice shall 
be provided no later than 14 days prior to Respondent's 
departure. Any such periods of residency outside Utah shall 
not be applied to the reduction of the terms and conditions 
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of this Stipulation and Order, unless Respondent 
sufficiently establishes, to the Board's satisfaction, 
continued compliance with the terms and conditions of the 
Stipulation and Order. The licensing authorities of the 
jurisdiction to which Respondent moves shall be notified by 
Respondent of this Stipulation and Order within 7 days of 
Respondent's arrival; 
e. Prior to end of the one year period, the 
Respondent may make a written request of the Board for early 
termination. The Board shall have the discretion to accept, 
reject or modify Respondent's request. 
f . ii Rocponrient snrrrpq 9 fully rrnmplpfps the tprmg and 
conditions of Lhe SLipulaLiun and OiJei,—Lhe Division ohal^ 
Lately fehe.iL.alLb! lilLaiiy PegtrlULlUllb un hi immediatel Lliii.i lLei ny I'e^ Lr C lug* 
T*v l-icenoGOt- Ifr on Lin uLhor handr* Respondent hereafter 
violates any of the terms and conditions of the Stipulation 
and Order in any respect, or violates any state or federal 
laws, rules, or regulations concerning controlled substances 
or the practice of medicine, the case will be referred to 
the Division for investigation and, where appropriate, a 
hearing shall be conducted before the Utah Board to 
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determine whether further sanctions should be (j.ssueg3 against 
Respondent's licenses. 
8. Respondent acknowledges the Stipulation and Order, upon 
approval by the Director of the Division, shall be the final 
compromise and settlement of this matter. Respondent further 
acknowledges that the Director may not accept the terms and 
conditions of the Stipulation and Order. If this Stipulation and 
Order is rejected by the Director, it shall be deemed null and 
void and without any force or affect whatsoever. 
9. The Stipulation and Order constitutes the entire 
agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any and 
all prior negotiations, representations, understandings or 
agreements between the parties. There are no verbal agreements 
which modify, interpret, construe, or otherwise affect this 
Stipulation and Order. 
10. Respondent acknowledges this Stipulation and Order, if 
adopted by the Director of the Division, will be classified as a 
public document and may be released to the public upon request. 
In addition, the Division is authorized to inform other state and 
federal agencies of the action taken herein and of the content of 
this Stipulation and Order. 
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11. Respondent acknowledges he has read, understands and 
accepts the terms and conditions of this Stipulation and Order, 
DATE: I Q - V - ^ DATE: lO-lO-lt* 
BY: 
H.?«XQ]LX 
R. PAUL ALLRED MICHAEL H. JENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General Respondent 
Approved as to Form: 
/ V ^ V A I BY: 
MAX D. WHEELER 
Attorney for Respondent 
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ORDER 
The above Stipulation is hereby approved by the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing and constitutes my 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in connection with the 
Petition in this matter. The terms and conditions of the 
Stipulation are hereby adopted as an Order of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing. 









November 6. 1996 Broadcast 






Dr. Sydney Wolfe: 
(Public Citizen) 
Mary Sawyers: 
What would you do if you found out your doctor was passing out drugs to 
addicts or worse yet, sexually abusing his patients. 
Well, he may be but you might never find out about it. News 4 Utah 
medical reporter Mary Sawyers joins us now to tell us why. And, Mary, 
isn't this information available to the public? 
Well, Randall, it is. You, you're glad it is. But most people don't know 
how to find it. Tonight I'll tell you how and introduce you to some of 
some of these so-called questionable doctors. 
I hope they take his license away. That he will never be a doctor again. 
Or in any profession where he can use people like that. 
She's talking about this man, Dr. E. Barry Topham. We found his name 
in this book, Questionable Doctors. It's published by a Washington 
watchdog agency. 
Utah is one of the worst states in the country in terms of how few serious 
disciplinary actions it takes against doctors. 
Public Citizen's book says Topham's license was suspended in 1991 
after he engaged in sexual relations with a patient. But there are some 
new allegations against Topham you won't find in this book. This woman 
says that in March of 1994 while Topham was removing her moles, he 
also made unwelcome sexual advances. 
J. C: He just immediately leaned over and kissed my breast and then inserted 
his fingers between my legs. 
Mary Sawyers: Topham denies the allegations, claiming J. C. made up the story for 
money. The doctor refused an interview but his attorney provided us 
with this statement. "J. C. unlawfully extorted $500 from Dr. Topham 
by threatening to ruin his career by going public with her false 
accusations and by threatening him with physical harm." The state 
division of licensing investigated and found enough evidence to file 
an action against Topham. That was more than two years ago. Lawyers 
are still trying to work out a settlement and the doctor is still in business. 
Dr. George 
Van Komen: 
We would like to see things move quicker. We would like to see these 
these actions take place. But we live in a country where you're innocent 
til proven guilty. And we believe in a system where everyone has their 
day in court. 
Mary Sawyers: But why do some of these cases drag on for years? Why is Dr. Wesley 
Harline still practicing four years after the state accused him of performing 
abortions illegally, disfiguring patients, even using silicone when patients 
asked for saline breast implants. And what about Dr. Michael Jensen? In 
July 1995 we caught him on camera promising me illegal drugs for weight 
loss. 
Dr. Michael Jensen: 
Mary Sawyers: 
If Fastin didn't work for you, I'd be willing to work with you, uh, maybe 
using Dexedrine. It's technically not legal for that reason. 
The state filed an action against Jensen last June. But, again, the case is 
in the hands of lawyers and Dr. Jensen is still practicing. In fact, it's rare 
for this state to strip a doctor of his license. According to this book, 
between 1986 and 1994,26 Utah doctors lost their licenses. That's about 
three a year. But some of those doctors will get their licenses back. 
Sherman Johnson's right to practice medicine was suspended in 1992 
after he was sent to jail for giving a patient a lethal dose of Demerol. 
But the state agreed to give his license back within five years and next 
year Johnson can once again legally practice medicine. 
Mary Sawyers: Now one postscript to our story. Yesterday we got word that action has 
now been taken against Dr. Michael Jensen. He's the one we caught on 
tape promising me illegal drugs. The state will allow Jensen to keep his 
license but he'll receive a public reprimand which requires him to 
attend a workshop on proper prescribing and a course on medical 
ethics. 
Kimberly Perkins: Mary, this book is eye opening. How do we get a copy? 
Mary Sawyers: Well, you can get it, Kimberly, by calling Public Citizen at 
1-202-588-1000 and make sure you specify you want the Utah copy 
of the book. It costs $15.00. Remember, the book only has doctors 
who have been disciplined. It will not include doctors who are only 
facing allegations of misconduct. To find out about those allegations 
you can contact the state division of licensing. Their number is 
530-6628. Or you can access that information on the internet at 
www.commerce.state.ut.us. Long address, but they have all the 
information there. You can find out about malpractice suits and find out 
about disciplinary actions, 
Randall Carlisle: Good report. Information we all need to know. Thank you, Mary. 
Mary Sawyers: You're welcome. 
